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The Death of Treaty
GEOFFREY R. WATSON*
INTRODUCTION

Treaty, like Contract, is dead.' The treaty doctrine ofpacta sunt servanda,

like the doctrine of consideration, has had to make room for an unruly upstart,
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 2 In fact, Treaty must now cohabit with a
doctrine of liability for gratuitous promises even in the absence of reliance-an
indignity rarely suffered by Contract, either in this country or abroad. 3 Treaties
must also give way to a reborn United Nations Security Council, whose
binding resolutions trump conflicting treaty obligations. 4 And treaties are
*Assistant Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law; B.A., Yale University,
1982; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1986; Attorney-Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, 1987-91. I
would like to thank Bob Menanteaux, senior research librarian at the Seattle University Law
Library, and Cherrie Tripp, my research assistant, for their valuable help. My thanks also
to Professor Tom Holdych for his helpful comments. With apologies to GRANr GILMORE,
THiE DEATH OF CoNTRAcr (1974).

1C. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACr 3 (1974) (providing an obituary for
Contract).
2 See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.L 3, 26 (Feb. 20)
(asserting "estoppel" could preclude Germany from "denying the applicability of the
controversial regime, by reason of past conduct, declarations, etc., which not only clearly
and consistently evinced acceptance of that regime, but also had caused Denmark or the
Netherlands, in reliance on such conduct, detrimentally to change position or suffer some
prejudice"); Alfred P. Rubin, The InternationalLegal Effects of UnilateralDeclarations,71
AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 16-23 (1977) (describing the development of estoppel on the
international plane).
3 Compare Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.CJ. 253, 267-70 (Dec. 20) (finding
that France was legally bound by unilateral promises to halt certain nuclear testing, even
absent a showing of reliance by other states) with E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRAcrs
§ 2.5 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that gratuitous promises are generally unenforceable in U.S.
law) and Rubin, supranote 2, at 22 (finding "no support in any known private law system"
for enforcement of gratuitous promises in the absence of reliance). But cf RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 90(2) (1981) (providing that "[a] charitable subscription or
marriage settlement is binding... without proof that the promise induced action or
forbearance").
4 See U.N. CHARTER art. 103 (providing that Charter obligations "shall prevail" over
inconsistent treaty obligations); cf Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971
Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992
I.CJ. 114 (Provisional Measures Order of Apr. 14) (holding that a Security Council
resolution superseded "whatever rights Libya may have enjoyed" under a pre-existing treaty
on terrorism).
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invalid if they violate unspecified "peremptory norms" of international law or
if they can no longer be justified in light of changed circumstances. 5 In United
States law, treaties have been marginalized by the self-executing treaty
7
doctrine6 and attacked by creative "reinterpretation."
Some would argue that Treaty cannot be dead because it never had a life in
the first place.8 On this view, international law is not "law" at all because it
cannot be reliably enforced. 9 A traditional response is to point out similar
shortcomings in domestic law, and to stress that most rules of international law
are in fact obeyed by most states most of the time, if only because they fear
reciprocal sanctions. 10 This response rarely convinces the die-hard positivist,
who insists there must be an effective global police force before we can speak
of international law. But even the most stubborn skeptic should concede that
whether or not it is really law, international law matters because it affects the
behavior of states. Even the skeptic may wonder whatever happened to
treaties." 1
This Article explores the decline and fall of Treaty. Part I of the Article
traces the origins and development of treaties. It argues that Treaty reached its

political and doctrinal zenith in the nineteenth century, the "classical" era of
international law, when diplomacy revolved around shifting bilateral treaty
5 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 53, 62, 64, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331,344--47.
6 See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 621 (Cal. 1952) (holding that the human
rights provisions of the U.N. Charter are not self-executing and therefore may not be
invoked by private litigants); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. I. INT'L L.
760 (1988) (criticizing the doctrine).
7 Compare Abraham D. Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative,
99 HARV. L. REV. 1972 (1986) with Abram Chayes & Antonia Chayes, Testing and
Development of "Exotic" Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation
Caper, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1956 (1986) and David A. Koplow, Constitutional Bait and
Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of Arms Control Treaties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1353
(1989).
8 See

JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 133 (Humanities

Press ed. 1965) ("Laws properly so called are a species of commands."); id. at 201 ("the
law obtaining between nations is not positive law.

. .");

F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO

SERFDOM 233 (1944) ("We must not deceive ourselves... in calling the rules of
international behavior international law..."); RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 8 n.10 (1990).

9 See Myres S. McDougal et al., Theories About InternationalLaw: Prologue to a
Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. 3. INT'L L. 188, 208-15 (1968) (describing the
"nonlaw" frame).
10 SeeLoutsHENKN, HOWNATIONSBEHVE 13-27 (2d ed. 1979).
11 Cf. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 4 ("Whatever happened to the doctrine of
consideration?").
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relations, and a state's promise was binding only if made in the context of a
formal international agreement. Treaties were the centerpiece of a "contract"
model of international relations. Part II explores the subsequent doctrinal
disintegration of Treaty. It asserts that the traditional "contract" model of treaty
doctrine has been challenged by a new "tort" model, one that holds states
responsible for their unilateral promises in the absence of mutual agreement or
even reliance by the promisee. I praise this development as an efficient means
of "channeling" diplomacy into a new form-the binding unilateral promise.
Part II also explores other doctrinal challenges to the traditional regime of
pacta sunt servanda.
Part ImI asserts that the decline of Treaty as an institution has been even
more dramatic than its doctrinal disintegration. This part argues that the
"contract" model of international relations, one that relied on interlocking
bilateral treaties between individual sovereigns, is being replaced by a
"legislative" model, one that relies more heavily on the "direct democracy" of
multilateral conventions and especially the "representative democracy" of the
United Nations Security Council. I applaud the legislative model as an efficient
means of codifying, unifying, and advancing the law, but I argue for a
continuing role for treaties, both bilateral and multilateral, to ensure that
international law develops democratically and thus maintains its legitimacy. In
addition, Part III asserts that the "legislatification" of international law extends
to United States domestic law, which denies effect to most treaties unless
Congress enacts implementing legislation. I argue that our preoccupation with
implementing legislation has unduly diminished the importance of treaties in
our domestic legal system. Finally, Part MII contends that the
"congressification" of United States foreign policy, together with a longstanding American missionary zeal, 12 has contributed to an "Americanization"
of international law that threatens to overwhelm Treaty. Increasingly, American
statutory law, not international agreement, regulates conduct outside the United
States. I argue that there is indeed a need for some American extraterritoriality
but that Congress and the executive should place greater emphasis on
international cooperation in the development of international law. Part IV
concludes with speculations on the possibility that Treaty will be reborn.

12 C. A.D. NEALE & M.L. STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINEss A

NATIONAL

JURISDICTION 208 (1988) (commenting on the "sense of imperial mission" in American
law).
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I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT

"[We may say that the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto
been a movementfrom Status to Contract."13 So too in international law. Over
the past two millenia, international law has moved from static rules based on
natural law to dynamic rules based on positive law. From Roman times to the
writings of the Spanish scholastics and the Dutch jurist Grotius, the
jurisprudence of international law was dominated by the notion that fixed
natural laws, divine or otherwise, dictated relations among states. Diplomatic
immunity, for example, was an inevitable consequence of the natural order of
things. By the nineteenth century, international lawyers focused instead on
what states actually
did, and on the rules to which they supposedly
"consented."' 4 Diplomatic immunity now stemmed from the practice of states.
A "contract" model of international law had emerged. By the late twentieth
century, diplomatic relations and most important questions of international law
had been defined by treaties.
This is not to suggest that treaties are a new invention. They have existed
in one form or another since the earliest human organizations were required to
deal with each other to divide resources or simply to avoid war. 15 In the fourth
millennium B.C., city-states in Mesopotamia concluded a boundary agreement,
preserved on a stone monument (a "stele"), that may have even provided for
arbitration. 16 Around 1272 B.C. the Egyptians and the Hittites concluded a
peace treaty that appears to have been honored by the parties. 17 The ancient
Greeks developed more complex treaties that sometimes covered trade and even
humanitarian law, as well as an impressive array of dispute resolution
13 HENRYMAINE, ANCIEr LAW 165 (Univ. of Ariz. Press 1986) (1864). And perhaps
back to Status, as property rights have become increasingly defined by statutory entitlement
and decreasingly defined by Contract. See Manfred Rehbinder, Status, Contract, and the

Welfare State, 23 STAN. L. REv. 941, 949 (1971).

14 Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS xxv-xxvii (3d
ed. 1986) (describing the move to positivism).
15 See generally ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 1-

16 (rev. ed. 1954) (describing treatymaking in antiquity).
16 See id.
at 1-2.
17 See ADDA B. BOZEMAN, PoLmcs AND CULTURE IN NERNATIONAL HISTORY 31
(1960) (citing GEORGE CHKLAVER, RECUEIL DE TEXTEs DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 1
(1928) (containing the text of the treaty)). There is some doubt about the exact date. See
NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 2 (suggesting 1279 B.C.); BOZEMAN, supra (suggesting the
treaty was concluded 50 years earlier); see also GEORG SCHWARZENBARGER, 1 A MANUAL

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (4th ed. 1960) (describing peace treaties in the fourteenth century

B.C.).

19941

T-EDEATH OF TREATY

mechanisms. 18 Early Chinese governments did as well. Indeed, Confucius's
proposed Grand Union of Chinese States appears to have been one of the first
experiments with collective security.' 9 The Roman Empire, too, entered into
commercial agreements with its neighbors. 20 In general, however, treaties
played a less important role in the international relations of the ancient world
than in the modem world. International relations themselves were of less
importance in ancient times, when communication and travel were infinitely
more difficult than today. Ancient treaties did not give rise to detailed treatises
21
on "treaty law."
Through the Middle Ages, treaties slowly grew in importance, but not
enough to generate a codified "law of treaties." In the Holy Roman Empire,
international law was in theory unnecessary, since a single sovereign enforced
imperial and ecclesiastical law throughout the Empire. 22 Even feudalism
discouraged the rise of international law, since feudal bonds sometimes
23
governed transnational relations between leaders in different countries.
Moreover, the Empire did not make many international agreements with states
outside the Empire. 24 In Asia Minor and the Balkans, the Byzantine Empire
also consolidated large areas under one rule. 25 An increasingly unified China
did treat with its Asian neighbors, but treaty relations with other states were

IsSee

BOZEMAN, supra note 17, at 79-85; II COLEMAN

PHILLIPSON,

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANcIENT GREECE AND ROME 127-48

THE
(1911)

(describing arbitration in antiquity); HENRY WHEATON, HISTORY OFTHELAWOFNATIONS IN
EuROaE AND AMERICA 1-18 (reprint 1973) (1845) (describing Greek practice). Inter-Greek
treaties were apparently more common than treaties between the Greeks and "barbarians"
(non-Greeks). See NUSSBAUM, supranote 15, at 5-6.

19 See Te-hsu Ch'eng, International Law in Andent Chdna (1122-249 B.C.), 11
CHaNEsESOC. &POL. Sd. REv. 38, 251, 256-57 (1927).
20
See PILLIPSON, supra note 18, at 74-89 (describing Roman treaty practice), 15458 (describing examples of Roman practice in international arbitration); NUSSBAUM, supra
note 15, at 11-12.
21 Not surprisingly, comprehensive commentaries on international law did not appear
until the rise of positivism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when scholars
became more interested in actual state practice rather than theoretical natural law. For an
exhaustive collection of older secondary materials on all aspects of international law, see
DR. J.H.W. VERZIL, INTERNATIONAL LAW INHiJsTORiCAL PERsPECrE, 400-34 (1968).
22

See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 14, at xxi ("[Almong the nations of Europe, as long

as the concept of [the Empire's] universal authority was ascendant, there was little need to
develop rules concerning diplomatic intercourse between sovereign states] .... ");
NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 17-23. In practice, imperial princes and municipalities did
treat with each other and, as the Empire eroded, with outside states. Id. at 23.
23 NUSSBAUM, supranote 15, at 22-23.
24
1d. at23.
25 See generally BOzaMAN, supra note 17, at 298-356.
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sporadic at most. 26 Still, the growth of commerce in and among city-states like
those in Italy and Northern Europe inevitably led to a growth in commercial
and maritime treaties. 2 7 This trend accelerated during the Renaissance.
In 1624, the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius published his landmark work De
Jure Belli ac Pacis,28 a treatise on the law of nations as well as private-law
subjects like property and contract. Grotius stressed the primacy of natural law,
but unlike the Spanish naturalists Vitoria and Suarez, who held that natural law
was purely divine in origin, Grotius believed that much of natural law had a
scientific basis and could be discerned through reason rather than faith. 29 On
the whole, his vision of natural law seems to have favored stable, long-term
treaty relations-"relational treaties," if you will.3 0 Thus, he embraced the
doctrine of pacta sum servanda3 ' (i.e., treaties must be obeyed) and he
maintained that treaties bind states after the death of the dignitary who signed
the treaty and even after change of governments. 32 He rejected the notion that a
treaty (or a contract) could not be binding until partly performed. 33 He also
seems to have advocated a predictable, objective approach to interpretation; in
his view, natural law required that a state be bound by a "fair interpretation"
26

See SIR GEOFFREY BUTLER & SIMON MACCoBY,

THE DEVELOPMENT

oF

INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (1928); NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 65.
27
NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 23-25.
28
HuGO GROTIUS, THE RIGrrs oF WAR AND PEACE (A.C. Campbell trans., Hyperion
Press 1979) (1625).
29 C. id. at 22 ("Now the Law of Nature is so unalterable, that it cannot be changed
even by God himself. For although the power of God is infinite, yet there are some things,
to which it does not extend.... Thus two plus two must make four .... ").
30
The term, of course, is Professor Macneil's. See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:

Adjustment ofLong-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,Neoclassical, and Relational
ContractLaw, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854 (1978).
31 See GROTIUs, supranote 28, at 174, 396.
32
Id. at 184-86. This analysis has greatly influenced subsequent thinking on state
succession. See generally Maria Frankowska, Book Review, 79 AM. I. INT'L L. 235 (1985)
(reviewing RENATA SZAFARZ, SUccESSION OF STATES IN RESPECr OF TREATIES IN
CON

PORARY nMRNANTIONAL LAW).

It is less clear whether Grotius believed that states could wriggle out of their treaty
obligations because of changed circumstances. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 112
(arguing that Grotius rejected this doctrine except where the circumstances in question were
the sole basis for the treaty). According to Nussbaum, Grotius was less enamored of the

doctrine of changed circumstances-the clausula rebus sic stantibus-than Gentilis, who
"introduced it into international law." Id. at 96.

33 GROTIUS, supra note 28, at 132 (criticizing the assertion that agreements have "no
intrinsic force of obligation"). As to enforcement of executory contracts in early AngloAmerican law, see sources cited infra note 104.
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from "the most probable signs" of its treaty commitments. 34 Grotius also had a
broad view of capacity, holding that it was lawful to enter into treaties with
heathen. 3 5 Grotius's work, which was translated into many languages and
36
disseminated around the world, had enormous influence in his day.
The Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which formally ended the Thirty Years
War, has often been called the beginning of modem international law. 37 The
majority of European states participated in the negotiations leading to the
38
Peace; commentators have suggested it was the first congress of Europe.
Among other things, the Peace granted member states of the crumbling Holy
Roman Empire the right to treat with nations outside the Empire, and it
39
provided that European states might take collective action to repel aggression.
Each state had a moral obligation to protect each other and to provide victims
of aggression with "advice and arms."'40 As Professor Schachter has observed,
this regime bore some resemblance to the more formalized Concert of Europe
of the nineteenth century, but the Concert of Europe was designed primarily to
34 Id.at 176, 177.

Inhis view, natural law could serve as a "gap-filler," for example,

when interpreting a peace treaty that dealt ambiguously with restitution and reparations. See
id. at 389. For more on Grotius's views on interpretation, see Bela Vitdnyi, Treaty
Interpretationin the Legal Theory of Grotius and Its Influence on Modem Doctrine, 14
Nam. Y.B. INT'LL. 41 (1983).
35 GRoTius, supra note 28, at 172-73.
36
See I.G. Starke, The Influence of Grotius upon the Development of International
Law in the Eighteenth Century, in GROTIAN SOCMTY PAPERS 162, 162 (C.H. Alexandrowicz
ed., 1972); NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 113. Grotius's influence appears to have declined
by the latter half of the eighteenth century, however, and his book is now of largely
historical interest. See Van Vollenhoven, Grotius and Geneva, in 6 BimLIOTHECA
ViSSERIANA 1, 17-18, 30-34 (1926) (minimizing Grotius's importance in eighteenth century
thought), dted in Starke, supra, at 162 n.2; but cf Starke, supra, at 164, 176 (arguing that
Grotius continued to inspire later thinkers "as the creator of the first satisfactory
comprehensive framework of the new science of the law of nations."). For more on Grotius
generally, see, for example, EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE LIFE AND LEGAL WRrmNs OF HUGO
GRoTius (1969); PETER HAGGENmAKKF-R, GROnUS ET LA DocrRiNE DE LA GuEuR JusmE
(1983); Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr., The Grotian ision of World Order, 76 AM. I. INT'L L.
477, 481 n.8 (1982) (citing other sources).
37 See, e.g., WHEATON, supra note 18, at 69 ("The peace of Westphalia, 1648, may
be chosen as the epoch from which to deduce the history of the modern science of
international law.").
38 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 115 (explaining that it may have been one of the
first congresses); see BOZEMAN, supra note 17, at 513-16 (describing earlier efforts to
foster constitutionalism on the international plane).
39 Treaty of Peace, Oct. 24, 1648, arts. I-iII, 1 Consol. T.S. 198, 319-22; see
NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 116-17.
40 Treaty of Peace, supranote 39, at 319.
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maintain a balance of power, whereas the Peace of Westphalia was founded
more on a sense of moral obligation to assist states under attack.41 Although the
parties to the Peace never mounted a "collective war" against aggression, the
Peace reinforced the notion that states might use law to regulate international
relations. 42
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries naturalist concepts continued to
dominate writings on treaty law, but a positivist response began to build.
Spinoza thought that treaties would bind states only so long as national interests
were not threatened. 43 Hobbes warned that "covenants, without the sword, are
but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all." 44 As treatymaking
increased, moreover, scholarly writing focused more on contemporary state
practice rather than examples from antiquity, the methodology favored by
Grotius and other naturalists. 45 In 1737, the Dutch jurist Cornelius van
Bynkershoek published Questions of PublicLaw, a study of the law of war and
the law of nations that gave short shrift to natural law, focusing instead on
treaties and other forms of positive law. 46 In 1758, Emmerich de Vattel, a

Swiss diplomat, published Le Droit des gens. 47 Vattel embraced natural law
and sought to apply it to the everyday practice of states, which in his view
evidenced natural law. But Vattel also drew an explicit distinction between the
"natural" or "necessary" law of nations and the "positive" law of nations,
which consisted of conventional, customary, and "voluntary" law. 48 Like

41 See Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. I. INT'L L.
452, 470 (1991) (asserting that the Peace reflected a sense of "common responsibility," not
balance of power).
42
Treaty of Peace, supra note 39.
43
BARucH SPINOZA, TRAcrUs THEoLoGico-PoLrrIcus 139 (Wernham trans. 1958),
referredto in NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 146.
44 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 123 (R. Tuck ed., 1991).
45 Grotius himself relied almost exclusively on examples from antiquity in De Jure
Belli ac Pads. See, e.g., GROTIuS, supra note 28, at 167 (describing the Roman Senate's
views on legislative consent to treaties).
46 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 168 (citing CORNELIUs VAN BYNKERSHOEK,
QUESTIoNs OF PUBLIC LAW (1737)).
47
See EvmMRICH DEVAT'rEL, THE LAW OF NATIONs (Johnson ed., 1863).
48
Id. at xvi (preface). Unlike the "necessary" law, which bound a state in its external
relations, the "voluntary" law of nations bound a state only "against her own conscience."
Id. at xiv. Earlier naturalists like Christian Wolff and Grotius had drawn a similar
distinction. See, e.g., GROTIUS, supra note 28, at 158. American courts have occasionally
entertained analogous concepts. See, e.g., Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207, 210
(1825) ("[The law of society has left most of such [moral] obligations to the interior forum,
as the tribunal of conscience has been aptly called .. ").
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Grotius, Vattel endorsed the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda,4 9 but he also
supported the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, arguing that significant changes in

circumstances could justify unilateral termination of a treaty.50
These developments anticipated the full-bodied positivism that emerged in
the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The German writer Johann Jakob
Moser 51 found the law of nature indeterminate and instead sought to compile a
voluminous amount of treaties, diplomatic notes, and other sources of positive
law to support more general propositions about international law. 52 But his
emphasis on observation and reporting overwhelmed his efforts to provide a
coherent synthesis of the law. 53 His countryman Georg Friedrich von
Martens 54 admitted some role for natural law, particularly in defining the
"natural" rights of states, but he also advanced a positivist vision of
international law.55 His Recueil des principaux traites, begun in 1791,
remained a principal collection of treaties well into the twentieth century. Von
Martens also published a treatise, the Precis du droit des gens moderne de
l'Europe fonde sur les traites et l'usage,56 which employed the positivist
method-that is, careful attention to treaties and other source materials-to
develop a system of the "rights" of nations. 57 Positivism reached its height in
the writings of the English philosopher John Austin. 58 In his view, law existed
only as a command. 59 Since no higher sovereign could command states,

49 See VATTEL, supra note 47, at 229 (asserting that treaties create "sacred" legal
obligations).
50
See id.at 260. Thus, Vattel argued that a prince who promises to help defend
another state may later ignore that commitment if forced to use all military resources for
self-defense. Id.Vattel nonetheless called for a "cautious and moderate" application of
rebus sic stantibus. Id. at 261.
51 Johann Jakob Moser (1701-1785).
52
See NuSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 176-79.
53
See id.at 178.
54 Georg Friedrich von Martens (1756-1821).
55 See NUSSBAUM, supranote 15, at 180-83.
56

GEORG FRIEDRICH VON MARTENS,

PRECIS DU DRorr DES GENS MODERNE DE

L'EuRoPE RONDE SUR LES TRAITES Fr L'USAGE (1789).
57
See NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 181-85. At the turn of the century, interestingly,
he also published the first "casebook" on international law. See GEORG FRIEDRICH VON
MARTENS, ACCOUNTS OF MEMORABLE CONTRovERsIES OF THE MORE RECENT EUROPEAN
LAw OF NATIONS (1800-1802), cited in NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 181. Unlike
Langdell's famous casebook on Contracts, which appeared almost a century later, von
Martens's casebook was not explicitly designed for a law school classroom.
58 John Austin (1790-1859).
59 See AUSTIN, supranote 8, at 133, 201.
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international law was not law at all, but "positive morality" akin to the rules of
60
honor. Not surprisingly, Austin had little use for natural law.
These intellectual developments coincided with a dramatic increase in
treatymaking and treaty interpretation in the nineteenth century. The Final Act
of the Congress of Vienna, signed by the major powers of Europe, brought
formal end to the Napoleonic wars and established fixed boundaries in
Europe. 61 The Vienna settlement also led to a semiformal system of
consultation called the Concert of Europe. 62 The Concert envisioned that the
great powers would meet periodically to deal with threats to the existing
balance of power in Europe. 63 This emphasis on stability suited a continent
rattled by the French Revolution and dominated by conservative regimes. The
Concert helped keep the peace during the first half of the nineteenth century,
but it was unable to prevent the unrest of 1848 or clashes like the Crimean
War, the Franco-Prussian War, and the First World War. Still the Concert
changed the way states conducted diplomacy, for it "habituated statesmen to
thinking on a new plane, more systematic and institutional than before." 64 The
institutional framework, the balance of power, was expressed in treaties.
Indeed, treaties became the currency of diplomacy. Diplomats embarked on an
era of unprecedented interest in treatymaking and treaty interpretation.
Statesmanship "often revolved around the interpretation of treaties," which
65
were "regarded as the fundamental basis of international relations."
60 See id.
61 See Act of the Congress of Vienna, June 9, 1815, 64 Consol. T.S. 454 (french text)
(also referred to as the "Final Act of the Congress of Vienna").
62

See Traits Entre la Grande-Bretagne et l'Autriche, Nov. 20, 1815, 64 Consol. T.S.
296, art. VI ("les Hautes Parties Contractantes sont convenues de renouveller, bLdes
6poques d6termin ... des rdunions consacrdes aux grands int6r6ts communs.. ."). This
bilateral agreement was concluded as part of the Definitive Treaty of Peace of Nov. 20,
1815, 64 Consol. T.S. 251. Other major powers signed similar bilateral instruments. See id.
These and other treaties constitute what the text refers to as the Vienna settlement. See
generally HENRY A. KISSINGER, A WORLD RESTORED (1957).
63

The Concert has also been called the Metternich System, named for Austria's
foreign minister Kiemens von Metternich, its principal architect. Metternich's diplomacy
became the subject of a doctoral dissertation and book by a future American foreign

minister, Henry Kissinger. See generally KISSINGER, supra note 58. For more on the
Congress and Concert, see THEODORE S. HAMEROW, THE BiRTH OF ANEW EUROPE (1983);
HENRY A. KiSSiNGER, DIPLOMACY 78-102 (1994); G. MANGONE, A SHORT ISTORY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1954); H. NIcHOLsON, THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA (1946).
64

Alfred Vagts & Detlev F. Vagts, The Balance of Power in InternationalLaw: A
Historyofan Idea, 73 AM. J.INT'L L. 555, 565 (1979).
65 David I. Bederman, The 1871 London Declaration,Rebus Sic Stantibus and a
PritivistView ofthe Law ofNations, 82 AM. J. JNT'L L. 1, 2 (1988).
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Diplomacy did not center around scholastic debates over natural law. Contract,
not status, governed relations among states. This "contract" model of
international relations-what I call "Treaty"-had reached new heights.
The ascendancy of treaties was not confined to security matters. After a
brief decline in the Napoleonic era, the volume and importance of treaties on
commerce, monetary policy, consular relations, and judicial assistance also
increased dramatically in Europe during the nineteenth century. 66 In addition,
the second half of the nineteenth century saw the first multilateral conferences
on subjects other than politics and security. Thus, in 1863, states sent delegates
to a postal conference and the first Geneva Red Cross Conference. 67 The first
Red Cross Convention 68 on humanitarian law emerged in 1864, beginning a
tradition of law-making multilateral treaties that has become an important and
innovative source of international law in the twentieth century.
During this period, even diplomatic failures occasionally helped foster a
belief in the utility of treaty relations. In response to Russia's efforts to disavow
the provisions of the Paris agreement6 9 neutralizing the Dardanelles, the great
powers issued the London Declaration, which provided that "it is an essential
principle of the Law of Nations that no Power can liberate itself from the
engagements of a Treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the
consent of the Contracting Parties by means of an amicable arrangement." 70
This pronouncement was intended to reject the doctrine of invalidity for
changed circumstances, or rebus sic stantibus, which had been approved by
Vattel and invoked by Russia to justify its position. 71 It thus embraced a highly
stable concept of treaties, with few if any grounds for invalidity. 72 Treaty
doctrine thus affirmed the traditional rule ofpacta sunt servanda. Treaty was at
its political and doctrinal zenith.
During the twentieth century Treaty has disintegrated politically and
doctrinally. The First World War erupted despite the elaborate network of
66 See NUSSBAUM, supranote 15, at 203-15.
67
See id. at 200.
68 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the
Field, Aug. 22, 1964, 129 Consol. T.S. 361. Multilateral treaties now account for much of
humanitarian law, treaty law, diplomatic law, terrorism, and other fields. See infra part Ill.
69 Peace Treaty, March 30, 1856, art. 11, 13, 14, 15 Martens Noveau Recueil 770.
70

The London Declaration, Jan. 17, 1871, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil 278, quoted

in Bederman, supra note 65, at 3.

71 See generally Bederman, supra note 65, at 17-29 (providing an "intellectual
history" of the London Declaration).
727Te strength of the doctrine was arguably evidenced by the onset of World War I,
when allies honored peacetime alliances and thereby became wartime allies. But that

experience is more commonly thought to demonstrate the poverty of balance-of-power
politics. See Vagts & Vagts, supra note 64, at 576 (citing contemporary accounts).

OHIO STATE LAWJOURNIAL

[Vol. 55:781

alliances designed to preserve the balance of power. The end of the Great War
in turn ushered in an ambitious scheme of collective security to replace the
failed balance-of-power system: the League of Nations. 73 The League was
organized as a loose confederation of states from all around the world, not just
Europe and North America. It was designed to prevent aggression and to
provide a forum for peaceful resolution of disputes. 74 President Woodrow
Wilson had campaigned for the League as a means to establish "not a balance
of power, but a community of power."75 Americans had long regarded the
balance of power as unfair to weaker states, and they were eager to do away
with it. 76 But the League proved too weak a replacement. Hobbled by
America's failure to join, it responded ineffectually to Japanese aggression in
77
Manchuria in 1931, and ultimately, the expansionism of Nazi Germany.
The demise of the League also marked the beginning of the decline of
Treaty. In theory, the League exalted treaties, for it sponsored the Treaty of
Versailles78-the agreement to end the War to End All Wars-as well as the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1929, 79 formally outlawing war. But these instruments,

like the League itself, were bitter failures. The Treaty of Versailles suffered for
lack of the equilibrium that had stabilized treaty relations in the preceding
century. The treaty required Germany to pay huge amounts in reparations to
other states, stirring resentment and fueling the rise of the Nazi party.80 The
Kellogg-Briand Pact was dead on arrival, flouted repeatedly in the 1930s and
most flagrantly in World War II. Kellogg-Briand is now derided as the worst

73 See generally The Covenant of the League of Nations, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol.
T.S. 195, 195 (dedicating parties to seek "international peace and security" and the
abolition of war).
74

See id. art. 13, at 199 (providing for arbitration in the event that disputes cannot be

resolved diplomatically).
75

E.H. BUEHRIG, WooDROW WILSON AND THE BALANCE OF PowER 260 (1955),

quoted in Vagts & Vagts, supra note 64, at 576 n.74. For more on Wilson and the League,
see N. GORDON LEVIN, JR., WOODROWWILSON AND WORLD POLITICS 168-82 (1968).
76
See Vagts & Vagts, supra note 64, at 576.
77
See generally JAMES A. JOYCE, BROKEN STAR: A STORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
(1919-1939) (1978); THOMAS I. KNOCK, To END ALL WARS: WOODROW WILSON AND THE
QUEST MR A Nnw WORLD. (1992); F.P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
(1960).
78 Treaty of Peace, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 188.
79 Treaty for the Renunciation of War, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
80 For more on the politics of the interwar period, see GEORGE ORWELL, THE ROAD TO
WIGAN PIER (1958); DAvID SCHOENBAUM, HITLER'S SOCIAL REVOLUTION (1980); and
RAYMONDJ. SONTAG, A BROKENWORLD, 1919-1939 (1971).
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81
example of Wilsonian naivetd, the paradigm of the ineffectiveness of treaties.

These instruments, along with the Covenant of the League itself, died in the
catastrophe of World War II. From a political if not a doctrinal standpoint, the
"decades of blood and steel" 82 marked the death of Treaty.
The creation of the United Nations in 1945 did not immediately resurrect
Treaty, at least not in security matters. World War II resulted in a bipolar
world, dominated by the two superpowers, that bore little relation to the
multipolar world of nineteenth century Europe. In this new world, the only
relevant balance of power was that between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Thus, Cold War politics quickly overwhelmed the multilateral political
system envisioned by the United Nations Charter, as superpower vetoes
paralyzed the Security Council. Security problems were governed in theory by
the United Nations Charter and in reality by a constant tug-of-war between the
superpowers. Arms control treaties eventually helped stabilize the bilateral
balance of power, but they were not central to the day-to-day conduct of
83
international relations.
To be sure, the end of the Cold War has rejuvenated the United Nations
Security Council. This development may have breathed new life into
international law, but it has not necessarily rejuvenated Treaty. In fact, I will
argue in Part I that the rise of the Security Council has not restored Treaty to
its classical heights, but instead has inaugurated a new era of international
relations governed by legislation, in which a few states have dictated the terms
84
of security for everyone else.

Outside security matters, the postwar era has given birth to "legislative"
multilateral agreements that generally have more influence on today's
international law than the traditional bilateral contract-like treaty. Beginning
with the four Geneva Conventions on humanitarian law, concluded in 1949, the
81 See, e.g., MARK LINcoLN CHADwN, THE WARHAWKS 47 (1968) (quoting one
skeptic's view that "political entanglement cannot be avoided by verbal incantations").
Nonetheless, the Kellogg-Briand Pact is still in force. And its idealistic theme has parallels
in popular culture. See, e.g., PAUL SIMON & ART GARFUNKEL, Last Night I Had the
Strangest Dream, on WEDNESDAY MoImNG 3 A.M. (CBS Records 1962) (imagining that
the world had outlawed war).
82 Arnold Toynbee, Commentary, in 2 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY.
1648-1967, at 1232 (Israel ed. 1967), quoted in BARRY E. CARTER & PimLip R. TRIMBLE,
IhTERNATIONAL LAW 1229 (1991).
83 For an excellent introduction to U.S. foreign polocy in the Cold War, see STEPHEN
E. AMBROSE, RISE TO GLOBALISM (2d ed. 1980). For more recent perspectives on the Cold
War, see LoUIs I. HALLE, THE COLD WAR AS HISTORY (1991); THoMAS G. PATERSON, ON

EVERY FRONr (1992).
84
See infra part Iff (elaborating on the consequences of the move from Treaty to
Legislation).
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international community has enacted a series of impressive multilateral lawmaking treaties.85 These range from humanitarian law and human rights law to
the law of diplomatic and consular relations, problems of terrorism and, of
course, the law of treaties. In a sense, these instruments represent a partial
triumph for the notion that international agreements can govern behavior of
states-partial because some (such as those on diplomatic relations) have been
more effective in practice than others (such as those on human rights). But as
with the reborn Security Council, these developments also mark the rise of a
legislative model of international law, albeit a model founded more on direct
86
democracy than representative democracy.
Finally, the doctrinal evolution of Treaty in this century has paralleled that
of Contract in that it has disintegrated (progressed?) from classical bright-line
rules to romantic fuzzy logic. The law of treaties, like that of contracts, has
recently been codified, and the codification has opened up a host of doctrinal
struggles. Like Contract, Treaty has recognized that some unilateral promises
might be binding, but has failed to establish a limiting principle. Like Contract,
Treaty has struggled to define when changed circumstances might justify
termination. Like Contract, Treaty has suggested that agreements may be
invalid if they violate public policy. The next part of this Article examines and
critiques these doctrinal developments.
II. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT, DOCTRINAL DISINTEGRATION
A. Formation:UnilateralPromises and PromissoryEstoppel
Treaty has always shared much with Contract. Both require mutual assent,
freely given.87 Both have adopted interpretive tools that look on pre-agreement

85 See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; Convention on Offences and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219;
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5.
86
Again, this theme is taken up in more detail in Part III.
87 Compare RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 17(1) (1981) (requiring mutual

assent and consideration) and Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533
(N.Y. 1971) (voiding modification on grounds of duress) with Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, supra note 5, arts. 9 (requiring consent of treating states), 52 (providing
that a treaty is void if procured by coercion), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 335, 344.
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negotiations with some suspicion. 88 Contract remedies are obviously better
developed than treaty remedies, which only occasionally involve money
damages or injunctive relief and more typically rely on the threat of
reciprocity-the threat that one's trading partner will stop shipping over
widgets, or the threat that one's extradition partner will stop shipping over
fugitives.8 9 Yet even this difference may be overstated. Businesspeople honor
their contracts for many of the same reasons as states-they may fear
retaliation, or more commonly, they do not wish to jeopardize a mutually
beneficial long-term relationship for short-term gain. Moreover, the reciprocity

sanctions contemplated by background treaty law are often supplemented by
more biting sanctions in treaties providing for recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards, 90 treaties establishing international criminal tribunals, 9 1 and
92
even treaties on human rights.
Still, Treaty differs from Contract in important respects. 93 One obvious
difference is choice of law. A treaty is governed by international law, a

88 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§§ 209-17 (1981)

(describing

parol evidence rule) with Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art. 32,

1155 U.N.T.S. at 340 (providing for resort to travauxprepatoiresin some circumstances).
89 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrs §§ 347-77 (1981) (describing
expectancy, reliance, restitution and specific performance) with Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art. 60, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346 (providing for termination or
suspension).
90
See, e.g., N.Y. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38; Algiers Accords
(Declaration of Algeria Concerning Settlement of Claim), Jan. 19, 1981, U.S.-Iran, points
2-6, 20 I.L.M. 223 (1981) (providing for establishment of U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal).
91 Agreement for Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the Axis,

Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]; Charter of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589; c. S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (establishing
war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia).
92
See, e.g., [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221; RICHARD B. LILLICH,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGrs 646 (1991) (asserting that the European Convention "has

established the most effective [human rights] enforcement regime yet known, regional or
universal").
93 Many commentators have issued stern warnings against analogies between Treaty
and Contract. See, e.g., EVANGELOs RAFroPOULOs, THE INADEQUACY OF THE
CONTRACrUAL ANALOGY IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 207-54 (1990) (arguing that legislative
consensus, not contractual consent, is a more appropriate analogy for Treaty); SHABTAI
RosENNE, THEMODERN LAW OFTREATIES 128 (1989) (arguing that the contract analogy is
"simply false" because, among other reasons, breach cannot be remedied through courts);
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contract by municipal law-that is, the law of a particular state. 94 In some
respects this distinction may be breaking down. It is possible to develop and
apply international law to a contract between states or even private parties. The
United Nations Sales Convention is one example. 95 But it is more difficult to
imagine applying any one state's municipal law to, for example, a multilateral
treaty on diplomatic immunity. First, most states do not have a fully developed
municipal law on diplomatic immunity or other subjects of international law;
reception of international law into municipal law has been notoriously
difficult. 96 Second, a state is not likely to entrust interpretation of its
international obligations to a foreign legal system over which it has no control.
In addition, the law of treaty formation differs from that of contract
formation. Though classical treaty doctrine had more bright lines than today's
law, classical Treaty never quite reached the formalist heights of classical
Contract. For example, there has never been much of a doctrine of "offer and
acceptance" in treaty law because there has been little need for one. States do
not negotiate treaties with a "battle of the forms"; they work with a joint text
and hash out every detail together at the negotiating table. States thus have no
need for a statutory nightmare like U.C.C. Section 2-207. 97 The chief problem
in divining mutual assent of states has been one of agency: who can sign for the
state? Treaty law addresses this problem with bright-line rules98 that would
have been the envy of the drafters of Section 2-207.
see also RESTATEMENT (TI=D) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 147 (1987) (asserting that
such analogies should be drawn with "caution").
Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court seems comfortable with the analogy. See, e.g.,
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 253 (1984) (asserting
that a treaty is "in the nature of a contract between nations"); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 720 (1893) (similar); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581,
600 (1889) (The Chinese Exclusion Case) (similar).
94
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art. 2(1)(a), 1155
U.N.T.S. at 333 (defining treaties as international agreements "governed by international
law").
95 Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 19 LL.M. 671 (1980).
The New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
supra note 90, applies international law to the enforcement of some contracts.
96 Cf. infra part ULIB (discussing the self-executing treaty doctrine).
97 Cf. Letter of Professor Grant Gilmore to Professor Robert S. Summers, Sept. 10,
1980, reprintedin RIcHARD E. SPEIDEL ET AL., SALES AND SECURED TRANSACrIONS (5th ed.
1993) 513-15 (describing § 2-207 as a "miserable, bungled, patched-up job").
98 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art 7(2), 1155
U.N.T.S. at 334 (authorizing signature by heads of state, foreign ministers, heads of
diplomatic missions, representatives to international organizations, and other persons
designated by their government as having "full powers" to sign).
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Treaty also differs from Contract in the substance of the exchange. There
has never been a doctrine of consideration in treaty law, much less an
insistence on "mutuality of obligation" or "bargained for exchange." 99 Nor has
treaty required anything equivalent to the civil-law requirement of causa-a
formal attribute that distinguishes a binding promise from a nonbinding one.1 00
Instead, a treaty merely requires an international agreement between consenting
states.101 Once the parties ratify such an agreement, the rule pacta sumt
servanda makes the treaty immediately binding upon them. 10 2 As in municipal
contract law, a treaty may later be set aside for fraud or duress, or performance
may be excused on grounds of impossibility or, perhaps, changed
circumstances. 10 3 For formation purposes, however, an agreement is enough.
The law of treaties has thus recognized that executory agreements are binding
even in the absence of partial performance. The agreement itself, and not one
party's reliance, is the basis for liability.
It is this characteristic that supposedly distinguishes Contract from Tort:
that individuals might create legal duties for themselves merely by making
reciprocal promises, and nothing more. And yet some commentators dispute
whether common-law Contract itself has long recognized liability based solely
on executory agreements. 104 Even today, when Contract supposedly does
99 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrs § 71(1) (1981) (bargain) and 1

WLLISTON, CoNTRACrs

§§ 37-49, 104-05A (3d ed. 1957) (mutuality) with Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art. 2(1)(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 333
(defining "treaty" simply as a written "international agreement" governed by international

law).
100 See Rubin, supranote 2, at 21 (describing causa); Ernest G. Lorenzen, Causa and
Consideration in the Law of Contracts, 28 YALE L.J 621, 630-39 (1919) (describing
development of causa).

101 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art. 2(1)(a), 1155
U.N.T.S. at 333.
It is unclear whether the law of treaties also requires a written instrument. Compare id.
(requiring a writing) with RESTATEMENT (T-IRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 301
cmt. (asserting that customary international law does not require a writing). Of course, the
same might be said of the law of contracts. Compare Law Reform Act (Enforcement of
Contracts), 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, ch. 34 (Eng.), discussed in E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CoNTRAcrs § 6-1, at 393 nn.8-9 (2d ed. 1990) (repealing much of the English Statute of
Frauds) with id. §§ 6-2 to 6-12, at 396-460 (discussing the vagaries of the typical American
statute).
10 2
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S.
at 339.
103 See id. arts. 49 (fraud), 51-52 (coercion), 61 (impossibility), 62 (changed
circumstances), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344-47.
104 Compare MORTON J. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 161
(1977) and Morton I. Horwitz, The HistoricalFoundations of Modem Contract Law, 87
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enforce purely executory agreements, damage awards may in practice reflect
the aggrieved party's reliance interest, not the more "contract-based"
expectancy interest. 105 A small kernel of liability based solely on executory
contracts may remain, but the real action is reliance-based.
To those who believe Contract is dead, the obituary appears in Section 90
of the First and Second Restatements of Contracts, which currently provides, in
part: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise."106 Under Section 90, a person can be liable for
her promise even if she received no consideration for it; it is enough that she
knew or should have known her promise would induce someone else to rely on
it to his detriment. 10 7 Although courts and commentators sometimes speak of
this reliance as a "substitute" for consideration,108 and the Restatement itself
labels Section 90 an example of a "contract without consideration," Section 90
is not really a substitute for consideration at all. It is an entirely different basis
of liability, one that more resembles Tort. 10 9 Like Tort, which seeks to avoid
future costs by holding the tortfeasor liable for the cost of his accidents,
promissory estoppel avoids future reliance costs by holding the promisor liable
for the cost of his promises." 0 Professor Gilmore contrasts Section 90 with the
Restatement's provision requiring consideration. "Perhaps what we have here
is Restatement and anti-Restatement.... The one thing that is clear is that
these two contradictory propositions cannot live comfortably together: in the
end one must swallow the other up.""' In fact, Restatement and antiHARv. L. REv. 917 (1974) with A.W.B. Simpson, The Honitz Thesis and the History of
Contracts, 46 U. CH. L. REv. 533, 543-47 (1979).
105 See Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages, 46 YALE LJ. 52 (1936) (describing the "reliance interest").
106 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§

90

(1932);

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
107 See, e.g., Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163, 169 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959)
(holding corporation liable for promise to pay an employee $200 per month upon
retirement).
108 See, e.g., Middle E. Banking Co. v. State St. Int'l Bank, 821 F.2d 897, 907 (2d
Cir. 1987) (describing reliance as a "substitute" for consideration) (citing Allegheny College
v. National Chautauqua Bank, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927) (Cardozo, J.)); Ricketts v.
Scothom, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898); see Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of

ContractDocrine,94 YALE L. 997, 1087 (1985).
109 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
110 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 95 (4th ed. 1992).
111 GILMORE, supra note 1, at 61; see Dalton, supra note 108, at 1087-89 (expanding
on this point).
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Restatement still do cohabit, perhaps largely because contract doctrine still
instructs the courts to ask first whether there is consideration; it then turns to

promissory estoppel as an alternative, a sort of last resort. By privileging the
doctrine of consideration, the law of contract has made it seem more important
than reliance, even though the latter may be just as tenable a basis for
enforcement in many or even most cases. 112
The same doctrinal struggle has emerged in treaty law. The most
authoritative source of treaty law, the Vienna Convention on the Law of
4
Treaties, 1 13 does not explicitly recognize a doctrine of promissory estoppel."
There is no "anti-Vienna Convention" to match the Vienna Convention
itself.115 But the concept of estoppel has been repeatedly applied by
international tribunals, and the notion of promissory estoppel in particular has
16
apparently been endorsed by the World Court.'
1 12

As Professor Dalton puts it: "[C]ourts apply the doctrines [of consideration and
promissory estoppel] sequentially; only if they find no consideration do courts invoke
detrimental reliance. This ensures, however precariously, that consideration will not lose
out to reliance." Dalton, supra note 108, at 1090. But cf. Daniel A. Farber & John H.
Matheson, Beyond Prondssory Estoppel: ContractLaw and the "Invisible Handshake", 52
U. Cm. L. REv.903, 908 (1985) (arguing that "promissory estoppel is no longer merely a
fall-back theory of recovery").
113 Even the United States, which has not ratified the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, regards it as "the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice."
CARTER & TRIMBLE, supranote 82, at 79.
114 Ile Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law does discuss promissory estoppel
in a reporter's note to § 301. "It is not clear whether such [binding unilateral] declarations
are seen as unilateral agreements governed by the law applicable to international
agreements, or having legal effect on some other basis, such as principles analogous to
estoppel." RESTATEmENT ('HIRD) OF FORREiGN RELATIONS LAW § 301 n.3, at 151-52.
115 Article 45 of the Vienna Convention arguably embodies a narrow form of estoppel.
It restricts a state's right to invalidate, terminate or suspend a treaty if it has expressly or
impliedly recognized the validity of the treaty in the past. If the rationale for this provision
is that other states will rely on a state's reaffirmation of its treaty obligations, then the term
estoppel may be appropriate. If, on the other hand, the provision is intended to bind the
affirming state even absent reliance by other states, then the term estoppel, with its emphasis
on reliance, appears misplaced. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note
5, art. 45, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 343. Qf SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEvELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF
TREATIS 1945-1986, at 104, 309-10 (1989) (expressing skepticism over use of the term in
connection with Article 45).
116 Some state practice also supports the proposition that unilateral declarations may
have legal effect. In 1957, following its nationalization of the Suez Canal, Egypt issued an
elaborate unilateral declaration detailing its intentions for future operation of the Canal.
Egypt registered the declaration with the United Nations as if it were a treaty. See
Declaration (With Letter of Transmittal to the Secretary-General of the United Nations) on
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Coincidentally, one of the first relevant World Court cases, Legal Status of
Eastern Greenland,117 came down only a year after the birth of promissory
estoppel in the first Restatement of Contracts in 1932. In Eastern Greenland,
the Court held that Norway was bound by its Foreign Minister's unilateral
declaration that Danish plans for sovereignty over all of Greenland "would
meet with no difficulty on the part of Norway."' 18 But the Court's decision did
not turn on any Danish reliance on Norway's promise. 119 Instead, as
commentators have noted, the Court emphasized that the declaration had taken
place in the context of negotiations and that Norway was responding to a
Danish inquiry in which Denmark promised to acquiesce in Norwegian
sovereignty over Spitzbergen. 120 As an estoppel case, then, Eastern Greenland
would seem to have limited precedential value. It holds that a unilateral
declaration may have binding force when given in the context of negotiationsspecifically, in response to a diplomatic concession by another state.

the Suez Canal and the Arrangements for its Operation, Apr. 24, 1957, 265

U.N.T.S. 299

(containing the text). States were divided on whether this declaration constituted binding
law, and denied its legal effect even as they continued to use the Canal. See Rubin, supra

note 2, at 6-7. Canal users presumably take the position that Egypt's obligations are
controlled solely by the 1888 Constantinople Convention, which provided for continuous
operation of the Canal. Constantinople Convention, Oct. 29, 1888, 171 Consol. T.S. 241.
Professor Rubin therefore concludes that Egypt is still free to revoke its declaration, but
only because other states have insisted they are not relying on it. See Rubin, supra note 2, at
7. As Professor Rubin suggests, it might even be said that by taking no further steps to
legalize its 1957 declaration, Egypt has relied on the users' implied promises not to invoke
the declaration, and thus that those users are estopped from changing their position and
seeking to hold Egypt to its declaration. See id.

117 (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.IJ. (ser. A/B) No. 53 (April 5).
118 Id. at71.

119 Nor, for that matter, did the Court express much doubt about whether the
"declaration" was a promise-a commitment-rather than a mere statement of intention.
The Norwegian Foreign Minister said that "the Norwegian government would not make any
difficulties [ne ferait pas de diffcultds] in the settlement of this question." Id. at 70
(providing English and French texts). The Court referred to this statement as a "promise."
See id. at 73 ("The promise was unconditional and definitive.").
It is a least open to question whether the Norwegian government intended to commit
itself to a course of conduct, as opposed to merely expressing an intention without making a
commitment. In domestic legal systems, "promissory" estoppel requires a "promise," not
just a mere statement of intent. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrS § 90(1)

(1981).
120

See Rubin, supra note 2, at 4-5; Thomas Franck, Editorial Comment, Word Made
Law: The Decision of the ICI in the Nuclear Test Cases, 69 AM. I. INt'L L. 612, 615

(1975).
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The Court applied something like estoppel in its 1951 decision in the
Fisheries Case,121 in which the Court rejected the United Kingdom's challenge
to Norway's maritime border delimitation on the grounds that for "more than
sixty years the United Kingdom Government itself in no way contested it." 122
A decade later, in Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear,123 the Court
applied a similar concept in another boundary dispute, this involving
sovereignty over a promontory containing a temple of cultural and religious
significance to both Cambodia and Thailand. The Court held that Thailand had
acquiesced in a map placing the temple in Cambodian territory and was
therefore estopped to object to it. 124 Several Judges differed on whether there
was any reliance to justify estoppel, or indeed whether reliance was required at
all.25
In addition, the World Court has apparently applied estoppel to its own
jurisdiction. The Case of Certain Norwegian Loans126 held that a defendant
state (Norway) was entitled to "rely" on limitations in the plaintiff state's
(France's) unilateral declaration accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction,
at least where the defendant's declaration was conditioned on reciprocity. The
extent of the defendant's actual reliance was unclear; it seems unlikely that
Norway would have rejected the Court's compulsory jurisdiction had France
submitted a broader declaration. In any event, the Court declined to extend this
rationale in Nicaraguav. United States,127 in which it held that the (defendant)
United States could not rely on a limitation in Nicaragua's declaration
accepting jurisdiction-a limitation that Nicaragua could withdraw from
jurisdiction immediately, without the six-month wait provided for in the United
States declaration. After Nicaragua the precise contours of the doctrine of
128
"jurisdictional estoppel" remain unclear.
The Court apparently endorsed a doctrine of promissory estoppel in North
Sea Continental Shelf' 29 One issue in the case was whether the Federal
Republic of Germany was bound by the delimitations provision of the Geneva
121 (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.CJ. 116 (Dec. 18).
122 Id.at 138.
123 (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.. 6 (June 15).
12 4 Id.at 34.
125 Id. at 37 (Alfaro, I., separate opinion), 62-65 (Fitzmaurice, J., separate opinion),
96-97 (Koo, J., dissenting), 131 (Spender, J., dissenting), 70 (Quintana, J., dissenting).
126 (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 LC.J. 9 (July 6).
127
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 LCJ.392 (Nov. 8).
128 For more on this subject, see Megan L. Wagner, Comment, Jurisdiction by

Estoppel in the InternationalCourt ofJut'ce, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1777, 1789-1804 (1986).
129 (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.. 3, 26 (Feb. 20).
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Convention on the Continental Shelf, 130 which the Federal Republic had signed
but not ratified. 131 Denmark and the Netherlands argued that the Federal
Republic should be bound "because, by conduct, by public statements and
proclamations, and in other ways, the Republic has unilaterally assumed the
obligations of the Convention; or has manifested its acceptance of the
conventional regime.... . 132 The Court seemed to approve the concept of
promissory estoppel, but found it inapplicable to the facts of the case:
[1]t appears to the Court that only the existence of a situation of estoppel could

suffice to lend substance to this contention,-that is to say if the Federal
Republic were now precluded from denying the applicability of the

conventional regime, by reason of past conduct, declarations, etc., which not
only clearly and consistently evinced acceptance of that regime, but also had
caused Denmark or the Netherlands, in reliance on such conduct, detrimentally
to change position or suffer some prejudice. Of this there is no evidence
13 3
whatever in the present case.

Perhaps the most interesting case on unilateral declarations is the Court's
1974 decision in Nuclear Tests. 134 Australia and New Zealand had asked the
Court to declare France's atmospheric nuclear tests in the Pacific illegal. The
Court found the lawsuit "moot" because France had made unilateral statements
promising not to conduct further above-ground tests. 13 5 The Court regarded
these statements as legally binding even though they were not made in the
context of negotiations (as in Eastern Greenland), many of them were not
written down, and some were intended primarily for domestic consumption in
television interviews and other informal settings. Indeed, the Court's opinion
did not regard reliance as an essential element for liability at all:
An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be
bound, even though not made within the context of international negotiations,

is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quidpro quo nor
any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction
136
from otherStates, is required for the declaration to take effect ....
April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. The text is also reprinted at 52
AM. I. INT'LL. 858 (1958).
13 1
130

North Sea ContinentalShelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 25.
Id. (emphasis added).
133 Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
134 (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.CJ. 253, 267 (Dec. 20); see also Nuclear Tests, (N.Z. v.
Fr.), 1974 LC.I. 457, 472 (Dec. 20) (a companion case).
135 Nuclear Tests, 1974 LC.J. at 271-72.
136 Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
132
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The Court thus adopted a rule that has been generally rejected in most
municipal legal systems-that gratuitous promises alone can be binding,
provided that they are made with the intent to be bound. 137 It seems safe to say
that this rule is an extension of the precedents laid down in the Eastern
Greenland and Temple of Preah Vihear cases. 138 More recently, the Court has
emphasized that a state should be bound by its unilateral promise only where
there is clear evidence of intent to be bound. 139 But it has not repudiated the
basic rule in Nuclear Tests-that unilateral promises can be binding even in the
absence of reliance.
Is the rule in Nuclear Tests justifiable? Indeed, one might ask more broadly
whether it is ever appropriate to enforce unilateral promises in international
law, even if they do not induce reliance. States make and break unilateral
promises all the time. Diplomatic history is the history of broken promises.
There may be reasons to treat a state's broken promises differently than that of
an individual's.
One possible reason relates to our moral assessment of the promisor. There
is a moral component to an individual's promise that is perhaps less discernible
in the promise of a huge bureaucratic entity like a state. 140 We can speak of the
character of an individual more easily than the character of a foreign ministry,
a collection of hundreds or thousands of bureaucrats. Even our language bears
this out: Individuals who break promises are said to be reneging, or worse,
lying, 141 whereas states who break such promises are said to be engaging in
diplomacy. 142 In a complex world, a United States Secretary of State has direct
control only over the broadest issues of policy; the day-to-day conduct of
routine foreign relations is always delegated to assistant secretaries, who in turn
137 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 49-51 (citing cases); Arthur T. von Mehren,

Gvzl Law Analogues to Consideration:An Exercise in ComparativeAnalysis, 72 HARV. L.
REV. 1009, 1016-17 (1959).
138

See generally Rubin, supra note 2, at 3-24 (arguing that the Nuclear Tests decision

went beyond precedent).
139
See Frontier Case (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.CJ. 554, 573-74 (1986)
(distinguishing Nuclear Tests on the grounds that, in a boundary dispute involving only two
parties, "there was nothing to hinder the Parties from manifesting" an intention to be bound
"by the normal method: a formal agreement on the basis of reciprocity").
140

. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 14-17 (1981) (describing the "moral

obligation" of promise); Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196, 198, cert. denied, 168 So. 199
(Ala. 1936) (holding that "moral obligation" is a "sufficient consideration" for a later
promise in certain circumstances).
141 See StSSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 152 (1978)

("If I make a promise, knowing I shall break it, I am lying").
142 Cf.AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEvIL'S DIcIoNARY 72 (1948) (defining diplomacy as
"the patriotic art of lying for one's country.").
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rely on deputy assistant secretaries, desk officers, attorneys, and foreign service
officers in embassies abroad. 143 On most issues, decisionmaking is spread
among a number of actors, and therefore cannot be identified with any single
personality.
This caricature of the modem state, however, denies any possibility of state
responsibility. In reality, the bureaucratic character of modem states rarely
precludes moral evaluation of their behavior. Personification of states is a
staple of foreign policy discourse. Large bureaucracies commonly regard each
other as everything from outlaws and renegades to friends and even "cousins."
Our politicians and television commentators do not hesitate to pass judgment on
the moral character of foreign states. Large bureaucratic corporations,
moreover, are routinely held to their unilateral and bilateral promises in our
domestic legal system. 144 And even if states embody larger bureaucracies than
most corporations, they are still led by individual men and women. The broken
promises that matter most are those broken by presidents, foreign ministers and
ambassadors, not by their less visible subordinates. Leaders can surely make
moral judgments about one another.
In any event, morality-empathy for the promisee-is not the only
explanation for our domestic law of promissory estoppel. To be sure, there
may be a moral component to promissory estoppel doctrine, 145 but moral
norms do not alone explain contract law. A contract system founded on the
notion that promise-keeping is a moral duty would enforce all gratuitous
promises, even those made in social settings, and those that did not induce
reliance. Contract does not. All legal systems distinguish between binding and
nonbinding promises. 146 Similarly, a contract system founded on morality

would distinguish sharply between benign and malicious promise-breaking.
Again, contract does not. Although courts have sometimes suggested that they
might punish willful breach more severely than benign breach, in practice they
have considered willfulness as a factor only in determining the measure of
actual damages.' 47 Courts have generally declined to go further and award
48
punitive damages for breach of contract, even for malicious breach.1
143 See 22 U.S.C. § 2658 (1992) (providing that the Secretary of State may delegate
functions to other officers and employees).
144See, e.g., Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959)
(enforcing unilateral resolution by corporate board of directors).
145 Cf Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365, 367 (Neb.
nonenforcement would be "grossly inequitable").

1898) (holding that

146 See Rubin, supra note 2, at 22.
147 See, e.g., Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235 (Minn. 1939) (imposing
higher measure of actual damages on breaching party because, among other things, its

breach was willful). But cf. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921)
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An alternative explanation for promissory estoppel is that it deters careless
149
promises that may induce costly reliance on the part of the promisee.
Promissory estoppel doctrine is efficient because it gives the promisor incentive
to make only those promises whose expected benefits to the promisor outweigh
their expected costs to the promisee. If, for example, a man promises his
granddaughter $2000 and she relies on his promise by quitting her job, he may
be liable for the cost she incurs in reliance.' 50 If he knows in advance that he
will be liable for the granddaughter's reliance costs, he will balance the benefit
of making his promise against the expected cost to him of his granddaughter's
reliance, and he will refrain from making the promise if it is likely to cost him
money-that is, if it is likely to cause more harm than good in the aggregate. In
this sense promissory estoppel resembles tort doctrine, which gives an actor
incentive to engage in an activity only if its expected value to the promisor
outweighs its expected costs to a victim or victims. In addition, promissory
estoppel doctrine guards against the "moral hazard" problem by imposing a
limit on the promisee's reliance-namely, a requirement that the promisor
"reasonably expect" that the promise will induce reliance. 151 Such a rule
ensures that efficient promises are not overdeterred. Similarly, tort doctrine
(Cardozo, I.) ("The willful transgressor must accept the penalty of his transgression....
The transgressor whose default is unintentional and trivial may hope for mercy if he will
offer atonement for his wrong.") (citations omitted).
148 See, e.g., White v. Bentkowski, 155 N.W.2d 74 (Wis. 1967) (declining to award
punitive damages against people who maliciously breached contract to permit the flow of

water to their neighbors).

149 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 110, at 97.
150 This hypothetical is loosely based on Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb.
1898). In fact, the Ricketts court, like most courts, focused on detriment to the promisee,
not benefit to the promisor. Courts assume, understandably, that the cost to the promisee
exceeds any speculative benefit to the promisor. Nonetheless, a gratuitous promise may
benefit the promisor by enhancing his reputation or securing the possibility of a return
promise in the future. Indeed, assuming that promisors generally act rationally, it follows
that promisors generally do not make gratuitous promises that do not benefit them in some
sense. An efficient doctrine of promissory estoppel might conceivably balance expected
benefit to the promisor against expected harm to the promisee. C. Farber & Matheson,
supranote 112, at 920-24 (stressing the importance of benefit to the promisor in promissory
estoppel doctrine).
The Ricketts court appears to have enforced the $2000 promise rather than awarding
reliance damages to the granddaughter. Cf infra at 32-34 (discussing remedies).
151 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 90(1) (1981). Oddly, U.S.
promissory estoppel doctrine focuses on the promisor's expectation that the promisee rely
reasonably, not on whether the promisee's reliance was in fact reasonable. See Robert
Cooter, Unity in Toil, Contract,and Property: The Model of Precaution,73 Cal. L. Rev. 1,
31 & n.67 (1985).
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may guard against the moral hazard by imposing a defense of contributory
52
negligence.'
Does this economic argument for domestic promissory estoppel doctrine
apply to its doctrinal counterpart in international law? More generally, do we
care whether public international law is efficient at all? A major purpose of any
system of contract law is to facilitate economic exchange, to promote an
efficient distribution of goods and services. But is that the major purpose of
public international law?
A significant number of treaties, perhaps a plurality, concern trade and
economic matters. According to one study, the United States negotiated more
treaties on economic policy and trade than any other subject between 1946 and
1973.153 The next most popular type of treaty during that period related to
cultural and technical matters; many of these agreements doubtless had
economic implications. 154 The remaining classes of agreement-ranging from
military matters to diplomatic immunity and transportation and
communication-constitute only a minority of those negotiated by the United
States, and in any event many of these also have obvious economic
ramifications. 155 Another study indicates that the "overwhelming majority" of
multilateral treaties are "economic in nature." 156 There is little reason to
believe that economic agreements have lost any importance in recent years, a
period in which the United States has, among other things, embarked on an
aggressive campaign to negotiate Bilateral Investment Treaties with major
trading partners.' 57 In practice, then, one major function of treaties, like
contracts, has been to promote economic advancement.
Economic analysis can also shed light on the law's treatment of
noneconomic treaties. Our domestic contracts, so often the subject of economic
analysis, are not devoted purely to "business" matters. First-year law students
152 See POSNER, supra note 110, at 169 ("The law needs a concept of victim fault in
order to give potential victims proper safety incentives.").
153

See LocH K. JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREE E Ts 3-19 (1984)

(noting that "[a]bout 37 percent of all agreements examined in this study were in this
area...").
154
See id. at 17 (estimating that 27 % of U.S. agreements during that period related to
cultural and technical matters).
155 See id.
156

See John K. Gamble, Multilateral Treaties: The Significance of the Name of the
Instrument, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 15 (1980). According to Gamble, 59% of multilateral
treaties concluded between 1919 and 1971 were devoted to economic matters. The next
most common type of multilateral treaty, "political" agreements, constituted only 27% of

the multilaterals concluded in that time period. See id.
157 See Richard Lawrence, U.S. Accelerates Effort to Build Global Investment Treaty
Network, J. CoM., Aug. 24, 1992, at A2.
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quickly learn that people can make contracts about all sorts of things outside
the realm of "business." Thus, the first-year canon includes cases in which the
purpose of the contract ranges from inhibiting a nephew's drinking and
gambling' 58 to watching the coronation of Edward VII from a nice vantage
point.159 If we can find economic consequences in such transactions, surely we
can also find economic consequences in a bilateral investment treaty or a
multilateral trade agreement.
Indeed, economic analysis can help illuminate all facets of public
international law, not just treaty law. As Professor Abbott has observed,
modem international relations theory assumes that states are unitary, rational
actors that generally seek to maximize their own well-being. 160 Although this
assumption does not explain all behavior of states, it does comport with much
state practice, and it seems at least as warranted as the common assumption that
individuals generally seek to maximize their own well-being. Even a
noneconomic agreement like an extradition treaty can be said to promote
efficiency, since the requesting state will typically "value" the presence of the
accused much more highly than the requested state. Treaty law, like contract
161
law, can and should encourage efficient agreements.
The weakness of international enforcement mechanisms does not imply that
it is fruitless to apply economic analysis to international law. It is true that the
162 As Richard
international legal system is in many respects a primitive one.
Posner has suggested, however, primitive legal systems often adopt informal,
decentralized sanctions and incentives that promote efficient behavior, albeit
imperfectly. 163 These enforcement mechanisms include sharing, gift-giving,
158 Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
159

Krell v. Henry, 2 K.B. 740 (1903).
See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern InternationalRelations Theory: A Prospectusfor
InternationalLawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L. L. 335, 348-51 (1989).
161 In fact, it would be difficult to use treaty rules to redistribute income rather than
promote efficiency because treaty partners would simply bargain around a redistribution
rule. Wealthier states would presumably exact a higher treaty "price," be it a political or
economic price. There may be good reason to redistribute wealth to poorer states, but direct
foreign aid or U.N.-sponsored relief are likely to be more effective than the treaty law for
160

this purpose. C. Harold Demsetz, Wealth Distribution and the Ownership of Rights, 11.

LEGAL STUD. 223 (1972) (arguing that contractual rules are not well-suited for redistribution
of wealth).
162

See generally Yoram Dinstein, InternationalLaw as a PrimtiveLegal System, 19
N.Y.U. I. INr'L L. & PoL. 1 (1986). Dinstein argues that international law resembles
primitive law in some ways, for example in the importance of custom and retaliation and
the link to religion, and that it differs in others, for example in the short list of norms in
primitive law as opposed to the extensive variety of international legal norms.
163 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 146-73 (1981). Posner adds

that "the primitive social equilibrium is less efficient, in the long run, than that of advanced
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moral duties, restitutionary remedies, and even violent self-help164-institutions
all found in modem international relations. Posner suggests that these
mechanisms work better when the population is immobile, since people must
live with each other even if they violate social norms. 165 Immobility, of course,
is a characteristic of the international community; states cannot hide from their
neighbors. International law has, moreover, established some (admittedly weak)
organs of government, including a World Court and a Security Council whose
decisions are generally followed. Economic analysis can help evaluate whether
this evolving system operates efficiently.
Is international promissory estoppel efficient? Suppose a state makes a
gratuitous promise to another state to defend the promisee's western frontier in
the event of attack, and the promisee relies on that promise by defending its
western flank lightly. If the promisor reneges on the promise, and the promisee
suffers because a third state attacks its western front, the promisee can of
course seek reparations from the attacker. But if that remedy fails, can the
promisee seek reparations from the promisor?
One answer is that the promisor should be bound because its unperformed
promise has harmed its former ally, and liability will deter such cost-inducing
promises in the future. The promisor-state, like an individual promisor, is the
"least cost avoider," the entity that has the most information about its future
behavior. It is in the best position to prevent harm to the promisee by avoiding
rash promises in the first place. Other things being equal, the law should
promote the efficient solution-the one that gives incentive to insure to the
more efficient "cost-avoider," the promisor.
A possible objection to this argument is that even if a promisor-state is in
the best position to avoid making a reckless promise (or to perform a promise
once made), promisee-states are almost never justified in relying on a promise.
Promisee-states may have much more information about the promisor than an
individual promisee in a domestic legal relationship. Promisee-states possess
vast intelligence networks that can sometimes predict what other states will do
in advance. The promisor's bureaucracy will often contain competing factions
that hold different views on the proposed course of action, and those factions
societies," and cites as evidence the "very small proportion of the world's population that
lives in primitive societies today." Id. at 205. This analysis might imply that the

international "social equilibrium" is comparatively more efficient, since the decentralized
system of international relations has persisted for millennia. In my view, however, a system
of world government would be more efficient than the current international regime, but
strategic behavior and information and transaction costs have thus far interfered with the
establishment of such government.
164

See id. at 154-55 (sharing), 157 (generosity), 159 (moral duties), 175 (restitution),

158 (self-help).

165 See id.
at 162.
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may not always communicate those views to each other-perhaps because they
are too busy, perhaps because they distrust one another-until the decision is
imminent. A foreign promisee-state that has wiretapped all elements of such a
bureaucracy may actually have a more cohesive picture of the whole than the
promisor-state's decisionmakers. In such a circumstance, any reliance by the
promisee might be unreasonable. Indeed, reliance by the promisee-state seems
particularly unreasonable given that a promisor-state sometimes cannot predict
its own future behavior. Promisor-states may have much less information about
their own future behavior than individual promisors. Individual promisors are
the sole custodians of their intentions. States, on the other hand, may never be
sure what they will do next. Such prediction depends on intangibles like the
outcome of the next election, the aggressiveness with which various portions of
the bureaucracy advance their interests, and the like.
Nonetheless, a doctrine of international promissory estoppel should attempt
to distinguish between "reasonable" and "unreasonable" reliance, much as
municipal doctrine does. 166 Unfortunately, the doctrine enunciated in the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases does not clearly draw such a distinction. Such a
rule would help guard against the moral hazard problem and thereby ensure
that promises are not overdeterred. Thus, a superpower would not be entitled
to disarm unilaterally in reliance on a weak state's promise to defend it.
Conversely, a small state might be entitled to rely on a strong state's promise to
defend it, but only to a reasonable extent, for example by deferring costly
defense appropriations.
A "reasonable reliance" rule is also consistent with the likely distribution
of information between the parties. Despite the existence of intelligence
networks, promisee-states will still usually have incomplete information about
the promisor's actual intentions, implying that some reliance by the promisee
may be reasonable. In general, promisor-states probably will have more
information about their own intentions than promisee-states. A promisee-state's
spy network is itself a large bureaucracy operating within an even larger
bureaucracy. Like all bureaucracies, it will make mistakes. Even if such an
intelligence network can gather information from each relevant bureaucracy of
the promisor-state, some of the information will inevitably be incomplete,
unreliable, or even misleading. And even if the intelligence network gathers
accurate information, it may not share it with all relevant actors in its own
166 Actually, U.S. domestic law does not necessarily examine the reasonableness of the
promisee's reliance. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrs (1981) asks whether the
promisor "should reasonably expect" the promisee to rely, not whether the promisee's
reliance is reasonable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 90(1). According to

one commentator, this phrasing suggests that courts "are reluctant to inquire into the
reasonableness" of the promisee's reliance. Cooter, supra note 151, at 31 & n.67.
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political system. Intelligence agencies routinely obtain mountains of data, and
they must sift it and analyze it for their clients to make any use of it. Inevitably,
some relevant information must be truncated, distorted, or lost.' 67 Not
surprisingly, the bureaucratic character of modern corporations has not
prevented the application of promissory estoppel doctrine even when the
168
promisee is a sophisticated multinational.
Another objection to "international promissory estoppel" is that it may be
difficult to know when a state has actually made a promise. A modern nationstate speaks with a thousand tongues, some authoritative and some not. 169 On
which of these can another state safely rely? In Nuclear Tests, 170 France was
held to be bound by officials' statements in television interviews, among other
things. This result is startling, to say the least. Treaty doctrine seeks to avoid
such a result by limiting the class of people who can sign treaties and by
requiring some formal evidence of intent to be bound internationally, namely
an "international agreement governed by international law." 17 1 Like the

72
doctrine of consideration, treaty doctrine performs an evidentiary function.'
167

See Myres S. McDougal et al., The Intelligence Functionand World Public Order,
46 TEMP. L.Q. 365, 368-69 (1973) (noting that an intelligence receptor is inundated by a
"barrage of sensory stimuli which it is practically incapable of ingesting"). Indeed, political

actors in our own domestic system routinely complain about the manner in which raw
intelligence is chopped down to size and filtered for consumption by the end user.

168 See, e.g., Mahoney v. Delaware McDonald's Corp., 770 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir.
1985) (holding McDonald's liable in promissory estoppel for breaching its promise to lease

a building from plaintiff after plaintiff bought it).
169
Even the most sophisticated states contradict themselves. Recently, for example,
Secretary of State Warren Christopher disavowed the views of the third-ranking official in
the State Department, Peter Tarnoff, who argued that the United States has withdrawn from
a leadership role in the post-Cold War world. See Steven A. Holmes, CristopherReaffirms

Leading U.S. Role in World, N.Y. TmES, May 28, 1993, at A6; Ioln M. Goshko,
A dinistrationRushes to 'aaif"Policy Remarks by 'BrandX' Offcia, WAsH. POST, May
27, 1993, at A45.
170 (Austl. v. Fr.) 1974 I.C.I. 253, 268 (Dec. 20); (N.Z. v. Fr.) 1974 I.C.J. 457, 472

(Dec. 20).
171 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art. 7, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 334 (establishing who may sign and setting forth formal requirements in Article

2).

17 2

See ROBERTO UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOcIETY 203-16 (1976); Lon L. Fuller,

Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800-06 (1941).
In fact, there is some uncertainty about whether treaty law requires a writing. Compare
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art. 2(1)(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. at
333 (requiring a writing) with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

§ 301 cmt. (1987) (asserting that customary international law does not require a writing).
Contract law is only slightly more clear on this point. Compare E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
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Still, there may be good reasons to relax the writing requirement in
international promissory estoppel, just as municipal doctrine does. A "Statute
of Frauds" may be a relatively cheap means of facilitating bilateral bargains,
but imposing a writing requirement on unilateral promises inducing reliance
implies that some inefficient but unwritten promises will be undeterred.
Moreover, an international Statute of Frauds may not be necessary to
distinguish authorized promises from unauthorized ones. If municipal law can
identify the proper agents of large multinationals, surely international law can
identify the proper agents of nation-states.
It may make more sense, however, to require a writing before enforcing a
unilateral promise that does not induce reliance. In general, enforcing such
promises is efficient because doing so enhances their value to the promisee, at
relatively little cost to the promisor.17 3 An enforceable promise is worth more
to the promisee than an unenforceable promise. Requiring such promises to be
in writing might deter a few of them, but this effect might easily be offset by
the greater certainty that a written promise provides. A writing requirement
would serve a "channeling" function-that is, it would "channel" this new
legal institution, the binding unilateral promise, into a recognizable form.17 4 A
form helps the drafter of an instrument select specific legal channels of
communication, making it easier for her to select particular types of legal
consequences. In the international context, a formal requirement would help
establish a new category of binding written promises for states to request and
provide in appropriate circumstances. Under this regime, a state would have
the option of clearly delineating which of its unilateral promises are legally
binding and which are morally binding. Promisee-states would know instantly
which promises can be counted on and which cannot. A writing requirement
would add a convenient new tool to the diplomat's bag of tricks.
On the other hand, a writing requirement might lead states to discount
unwritten promises even more than they do now. In other words, while written
promises might be worth more under such a regime, unwritten promises would
be worth less. States might begin to insist on getting everything in writing, no
CoNTRAcrs § 6.1, at 393 & nn.8-9 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing repeal of much of the English
Statute of Frauds) with id. §§ 6-2 to 6-12, at 396-460 (discussing the vagaries of the typical
American statute).
173 This reasoning grows out of Judge Posner's argument to justify enforceability of
gratuitous promises in domestic law. See Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in

Economdcs and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 411-13 (1977), reprinted in A. KRONMAN &
RicHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CoNTRAcr LAW 46-47 (1979). "The size of [a]
gift (in present-value terms) will be increased at no cost to [the donor]. Here is a clear case
where the enforcement of a gratuitous promise would increase net social welfare." Id. at 47.
174 See Fuller, supra note 172, at 800.

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:781

matter how trivial, since the spoken word would have no value. The result
might be a shift from a flexible diplomacy of conversation and argument to a
more rigid diplomacy of diplomatic notes and responses.
But such a scenario seems exceedingly unlikely. States always will be
willing to trust some nonbinding promises-probably the less important ones.
States trust one another's assurances not because they might be legally binding,
but because it is in the promisor's interests not to renege too often.1 75 Even if a
new category of "binding unilateral promises" tends to "ratchet up" diplomacy
to a more formal level, states can be encouraged to retain the option of the
informal, nonbinding promise by making it more difficult to make a binding
promise-for example, by imposing an additional formal requirement like
ratification. Adding a new species of binding promises would not detract from
informal diplomacy; it would simply expand the options of promisors and
promisees. Just as states are free to choose among treaties of widely different
levels of formality and legal effect-ranging from an exchange of notes, to a
memorandum of understanding, to a formal multilateral convention-so states
should be free to choose among a variety of unilateral promises.
In sum, economic analysis supports liability for written promises that do
not induce reliance as well as promises that do. What remedies, then, are
appropriate for nonperformance of a binding unilateral promise or
nonperformance of a promise inducing reasonable reliance?
The remedies provided in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
are inapplicable to unilateral promises made outside the context of an
agreement. The Vienna Convention provides for suspension or termination of a
treaty in response to breach. 176 This is a remedy of rescission, not damages. It
is obviously irrelevant to a case involving a gratuitous promise, since the
promisee never owed the promisor a reciprocal performance in the first place.
The Vienna Convention, however, is not the only source of remedies for
nonperformance of promises. State responsibility doctrine mandates reparations
for breach of a substantive obligation under international law. 177 There is no
conceptual reason that this doctrine could not apply to unilateral promises.
175 Indeed, some would argue that self-interest motivates most compliance with

international law. See, e.g., Christopher C. Joyner, Sanctions, Conpiance and
InternationalLaw: Reflections on the United Nations' Experience Against Iraq, 32 VA. 1.
INT'L L. 1, 32 (1991); Phillip R. Trimble, InternationalLaw, World Order, and Critical
Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811 (1990); Rex J. Zedalis, Protection of Nationals
Abroad: Is Consent the Basis of Legal Obligation, 25 TEx. INT'L L.J 209, 257 n.274

(1990).
176 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art. 60, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 369 (providing for termination or suspension in response to a "material
breach").
177 See HENKN ET AL., supra note 14, at 545.

19941

THE DEATH OF REATY

One could imagine, for example, an "expectancy" theory of reparations for
breach of a gratuitous promise that does not induce reliance. On an expectancy
theory of reparations, the promisor would be obliged to put the prornisee in the
position the promisee would have been in had the promise been performed.
This theory could require enforcement of the terms of the promise-a specific
performance remedy, the perfect expectancy measure-or damages
approximating the disappointed promisee's expectations. This remedy ensures
that the promisee attaches the correct "expected value" to the promise when it
is made. The remedy would be admittedly generous when compared to the
rescission remedy for breach of treaty, but that simply implies that expectancy
damages should be available for breach of treaty as well as breach of a binding
unilateral promise. As in contract law, an expectancy remedy would be more
178
efficient than the rescission remedy, which does not adequately deter breach.
The remedy in international promissory estoppel doctrine should be the
"reliance" measure. On this theory, the promisee is placed in the position it
occupied before the promise was made. This remedy is efficient because it
factors the promisee's actual damages into the promisor's decision to make and
perform a promise. It is analogous to strict liability in tort, in that the promisor
is liable regardless of whether the promisor's nonperformance was negligent.
As in tort, the moral hazard problem can be controlled by placing limits on the
victim's behavior. In tort, this can be achieved by establishing a contributory
negligence defense to strict liability. In promissory estoppel, it can be achieved
by establishing a "reasonableness" limit on the promisee's reliance.
Unfortunately, these remedies-expectancy for the gratuitous promise,
reliance for promissory estoppel-are not likely to be efficient when applied in
the international context. The likelihood of enforcement is so low that almost
any damage remedy will underdeter the making of inefficient promises. This
problem can be addressed by greatly increasing the size of the damage remedy,
so that the expected cost of breach resembles its actual cost. As the literature on
the economics of crime indicates, this solution can be more efficient than
relying on more frequent and more likely enforcement, since enforcement costs
are high. 179 But if states, like individuals, are risk-averse, then extremely high
damages will overdeter promises because states will not want to take any
chance that their treasuries will be depleted. Moreover, there is no tradition of
punitive damages in international law, suggesting that the costs of imposing
such a remedy may be high. It may be best to rely on the simple expectancy
178 q POSNER, supra note 110, at 119, 121 (discussing some of the merits of the
expectancy measure).
179 See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169 (1968); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optima! Tradeoff
Between the Probabilityand Magnitude ofFines, 69 AM. ECON. REv. 880 (1979).
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and reliance measures and focus attention on improving what enforcement
mechanisms do exist.
To summarize, the World Court has created a potentially open-ended basis
for state responsibility-the "contort" of making a unilateral promise. The
Court has even suggested that an informal, internal statement might give rise to
such liability, even without a showing of substantial detrimental reliance by
another state. A doctrine of promissory estoppel alone seems justifiable on the
international plane, since the promisor is probably the least cost avoider.
Enforcement of gratuitous promises in the absence of reliance is still an entirely
different matter, potentially exposing states to liability for every utterance, no
matter how contradictory. To control the gratuitous promise doctrine, the
Court or an appropriate law-making convention should clarify that gratuitous
promises that do not induce reliance are binding only when made with clear
intent to be bound. That intent could be demonstrated by a writing signed by a
high-ranking state official, or perhaps even by ratification through the state's
normal constitutional processes.
It is too soon to tell whether the World Court's decisions in Nuclear Tests
and the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases will revolutionize Treaty the way
Section 90 of the First Restatement of Contracts revolutionized Contract. Such
cases will not reach the World Court or any other international tribunal very
often, if only because negotiation is the normal means of dispute resolution on
the international plane. Yet there are no indications that the Court is prepared
to do away with these holdings. Perhaps some future international conference
will codify the rule in the next iteration of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, thereby proclaiming the demise of Treaty in the treaty on treaties
itself-a mild irony. Le Roi est mort: rive le Roi.
B. Invalidity: From Status to Contractto Status
If promissory estoppel challenges the traditional doctrine of pacta sunt
servanda, it does not threaten the positivist assumption that underlies treatiesthat international law depends on the consent of states, whether expressed in an
international agreement or a unilateral declaration. Another recent doctrinal
development, however, presents such a threat. 180 Article 53 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that "[a] treaty is void if, at the
time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general

180 See CARTER & TRmBLE, supra note 82, at 98-99 (noting that the Vienna
Convention "introduces" jus cogens and that "this kind of super-constitutional law is
obviously inconsistent" with positivist approaches).
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international law." 181 The Article defines a "peremptory norm"-also known
as jus cogens-as a generally accepted norm "from which no derogation is
permitted," one that can be modified only by a subsequent norm "having the
same character." 82 Article 64 provides that an existing treaty becomes void if
a new peremptory norm "emerges." 8 3 The Vienna Convention does not give
examples of peremptory norms, but the United States Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law offers up a short list of candidates, including norms that prohibit
genocide, slavery, war, and possibly terrorism. 184 Other commentators have
advanced shorter and longer lists.' 8 5 No one is certain just what norms are
181 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S.
at 344.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 350. In addition, Article 66(a) provides for special resolution of disputes
relating tojus cogens. It provides that any state party to the Vienna Convention may submit
a dispute over Articles 53 and 64, the substantive provisions on jus cogens, to the
International Court of Justice. Id. at 348. Under Article 66(b), disputes over other
provisions of the Convention are supposed to be submitted to an ad hoe conciliation
commission in accordance with procedures outlined in the Annex to the Convention. Id. In
theory, then, the Convention provides for a more formalized means of resolving disputes
overjus cogens, suggesting that the drafters viewed jus cogens as a doctrine of paramount
importance. In practice, these dispute resolution mechanisms of Article 66 have never been
applied.
Article 71 of the Vienna Convention establishes the consequences of invalidity of a
treaty that violates peremptory norms of international law. Id. at 349. If the treaty is invalid
ab initfo, Article 71(1)(b) provides that states must "bring their relations into conformity
with the peremptory norm." Id. If the treaty is deemed invalid as a result of a supervening
norm, Article 71(2) releases the parties from their future obligations under the treaty
without affecting obligations already created, provided that those obligations persist "only to
the extent that their maintenance is not in itself in conflict with the new peremptory norm."
Id. One interesting question is whether an entire treaty is void if only part of it conflicts with
jus cogens. See TASLIN OLAWALE ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 140 (1974)
(asserting that "separability is permitted," but quoting an International Law Commission
report that argues against separability).
184 See RESTATEMENT(rHIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 n.6, at 34 (1987).
185
CGopareIAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 22224 (2d ed. 1984) (arguing that the prohibition on use of force isjus cogens, but that beyond
that "uncertainty begins") with Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, The Law of Treaties, 159
REc. DES COUPS 9, 64-65 (1978-1) (arguing thatjus cogens includes prohibitions against use
of force, genocide, piracy, slavery, racial discrimination, hostage-taking, and possibly
hijacking or trade in narcotics) and Grigory Tunkin, InternationalLaw in the International
System, 147 REc. DES CouPs 98 (1975-IV) (asserting that Soviet international lawyers
accept "all fundamental principles of the present-day international law" as jus cogens).
These and other examples are quoted at length in HENKIN Lrr AL., supra note 14, at 467-75.

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:781

"peremptory," partly because the doctrine has rarely if ever been invoked in
any formal setting.
Even if this doctrine has not yet sprung to life, there should be no
mistaking its startling implications. The doctrine is truly a "brooding
omnipresence in the sky," 18 6 a potentially disruptive force that has not yet been
unleashed. Taken to its extreme, jus cogens doctrine could hold that no treaty

could ever violate any existing rule of international law-a position apparently
adopted by Soviet writers in the 1970s. 187 If this were the rule, states would
never be permitted to change international law through treatymaking. For
example, states would not be permitted to conclude a treaty providing for
routine searches of diplomats' personal baggage to prevent terrorism, since
international law currently forbids such searches in the absence of "serious
grounds for presuming" that the baggage contains contraband. 188 The result
would be the death of interesting treaties, if not the death of Treaty altogether.
In more than one sense, the doctrine suggests a movement from contract
back to status. If applied aggressively, it could discourage innovation in
treatymaking, and thus lead to a static system of international law. More
fundamentally, the doctrine represents a further disintegration of the pure
contract model of Treaty that prevailed in the nineteenth century. It suggests
that states are no longer as free to order their own affairs-that some decisions
have been made for them in advance. In this respect, the doctrine resembles
domestic constitutionalism, which has been said to shield us from "regret," and
to protect us from ourselves by ensuring that we do not trample fundamental

The International Law Commission, which drafted the Vienna Convention, refused to
enumerate examples ofjus cogens because doing so might "lead to misunderstanding" about
"other cases not mentioned in the article" and because listing examples would have required
"a prolonged study of matters which fall outside the scope of the present articles."
International Law Cormission Report, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Conm'n 169, 247-49, U.N.
Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966.
186 Cf Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1916) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
187
See Tunkin, supra note 185, at 98, quoted in HENKN ET AL., supra note 14, at

472.
188 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
500 U.N.T.S. 95. In fact, some members of Congress have recently sought to liberalize the
rules on routine searches of diplomats. See, e.g., Diplomatic Immunity Abuse Prevention
Act, reprinted in 133 CONG. REc. S14,055 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987). For more on this
subject, see Leslie Shirin Farhangi, Note, Insuring Against Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity,
38 STAN. L. REV. 1517 (1986); Mitchell S. Ross, Rethinking Diplomatic Immunity: A

Review of Remedial Approaches to Address the Abuses of Diplomatic Privileges and
Immunities, 4 AM. U. J. INT'LL. & POL'Y 173 (1989).
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norms in the heat of the legislative moment.' 8 9 But jus cogens lacks the
legitimacy that stems from a written constitution. The United Nations Charter,
the instrument that most resembles an international constitution, may provide
one or two peremptory norms such as the prohibitions on human rights
violations and the use of force. 190 Yet if jus cogens was intended merely to
prohibit violations of Charter norms, it was unnecessary because Charter
obligations already prevail over inconsistent treaty obligations. 191 It may be
that jus cogens was intended to establish peremptory norms beyond those
expressed specifically in the Charter, such as a prohibition on terrorism. If that
is the case, however, it is difficult indeed to identify the locus of legitimacy of
the doctrine. The creator ofjus cogens, the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, is just another treaty itself, albeit one that codifies customary law.
Of course, the domestic counterpart ofjus cogens, the doctrine of illegality
(or public policy), does not usually depend on a written constitution for its
legitimacy. It looks instead to lesser sources of law, such as legislative
enactments or even nonbinding pronouncements by governmental officials.
Thus, a contract term is unenforceable if it is prohibited by legislation or if its
enforcement "is clearly outweighed" by a "public policy." 192 In economic
terms, a contract term violates public policy if it imposes unacceptable external
costs on third parties. 193 Perhapsjus cogens can also look to less lofty sources
of law to support its legitimacy. After all, the Vienna Convention formulation
defines peremptory norms as those "accepted and recognized by the
international community as a whole" from which "no derogation is
permitted." 194 At least the first half of this phrase suggests a role for positive
law in the creation of jus cogens. Perhaps, then, jus cogens should be
conceptualized as a rule of public policy, subject to "legislative" change by the
world community, rather than a rule of constitutional law, immune from
change. A public policy conception of jus cogens might induce greater
compliance than a constitutional conception. States are more likely to abide by
a rule over which they have some control.
189

See Robin L. West, Taking Preferences Seriously, 64 TuLANE L. REv. 659, 661-

62 (1990) (noting that many jurists regard enforcement of constitutional norms, like
enforcement of private contracts, as a means of enforcing prior preferences "against later
regret").
190 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 2 (use of force), 55-56 (human rights).
191 See id. art. 103.

192 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981); see In re Baby M., 537
A.2d 1227 (NJ. 1988) (striking down surrogacy contract because, inter alia, it violated
public policy).

193 See POSNER, supranote 110, at 108.
194

at 344.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S.
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As currently configured, however, thejus cogens doctrine resembles a rule
of constitutional law more than one of public policy. Peremptory norms are
more fixed and harder to change than domestic rules of public policy and
perhaps even domestic rules of constitutional law. Domestic public policy can
often be changed by a majority vote of the legislature, or sometimes even by an
order of the executive. By contrast, a change in jus cogens, like a change in a
constitution, requires a large supermajority.' 95 A peremptory norm can only be
modified by a subsequent norm "having the same character"-that is, another
norm with the support of the international community "as a whole." 196 Thus, a
bilateral treaty by definition could not contradict the peremptory norm. A
multilateral law-making treaty might itself qualify as a new rule of'jus cogens
that could trump the old rule, 197 but it would probably require the concurrence
of a "very large majority" 198 of states-a threshold rarely achieved by
multilateral treaties.199 Alternatively, the United Nations Security Council
195 See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. art. V (providing that constitutional amendments be ratified
by three-fourths of the states).
196 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S.
at 344. The general consensus is that such a norm requires the support of the
"overwhelming majority" of states. See Stanislaw E. Nahlik, Book Review, 84 AM. J. INT'L
L. 779, 780 (1990).
19 7

See JERZY SZTUCKI, Jus COGENS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF

TREATiES 111 (1974), cited in HENKINET AL., supra note 14, at 474 n.7.
198 See Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, quoted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 473. The Vienna
Convention itself arguably sets an even higher standard-consent by "the community of
States as a whole ..... Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art. 53,
1155 U.N.T.S. at 344.
199 The U.N. Charter is one of the few conventions that clearly meets that standard.
The Statute of the International Court of Justice also meets the standard, but parties to the
Charter are ipso facto parties to the Statute. See U.N. CHARTER art. 931. One hundred and
fifty-two states are party to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, so it would also
appear to meet the "great" or "overwhelming" majority standard, but it establishes few if
anyjus cogens norms.
Many other fundamental treaties have not been ratified by a great majority, or in some
cases even by a simple majority of states. Only 59 states are party to the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. The fundamental human rights treaties barely command the assent
of a majority of states. Only 90 are party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Only 92 are party to the International Covenant
on Economic and Social Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. Other human rights
treaties have fared somewhat better. One hundred and twenty-five states are party to the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7,
1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. One hundred states are party to the Convention on the

1994]

THE DEATH OF TREA7Y

might be able to make new law by invoking its broad powers under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter. Article 25 of the Charter provides that
decisions of the Council bind all states, and Article 103 provides that Charter
obligations prevail over pre-existing treaty obligations. Nonetheless, as I have
argued elsewhere, the Council's powers are not unlimited. 2°° I doubt that a
20
Council resolution can supersede a peremptory norm of international law. ' I
have even suggested that the World Court may have some power of judicial
2°2
review to invalidate Council resolutions that floutjus cogens.
The Vienna Convention's special procedural rules for jus cogens also
suggest that it enjoys a quasi-constitutional status. At the Vienna Conference,
proponents of jus cogens reassured skeptics by adding a provision permitting
states to take disputes over jus cogens to the World Court-a procedure not
available for disputes over other aspects of the Convention. 20 3 This added
procedural protection apparently comforted some states, mostly those with a
stake in stable treaty relations, by ensuring thatjus cogens would not lead to an
epidemic of unilateral treaty terminations; an objective observer would first
have to pass judgment on the termination. It does appear that this mechanism
has kept jus cogens in check. As of this writing, the World Court has never
heard a case involving a dispute over termination of a treaty for violation ofjus
cogens, and few states have attempted to invoke the doctrine unilaterally. In
any event, the Convention has entrusted the development ofjus cogens doctrine
to the international judiciary, just as many domestic constitutions entrust the
development of constitutional law to a domestic judiciary. 204 Thus far, the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 19 LL.M. 33

(entered into force in 1980).
Only 83 states are party to the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517. Twenty-one
states are party to the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence, Mar. 18, 1970, 23
U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231. Only 44 are party to the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261.
20 0

See Geoffrey R. Watson, Consttutionais7n,JudicialReview, and the Word Court,

34 HARV. INT'L L.. 1, 28-45 (1993) (arguing that the World Court has a limited power of

judicial review over Security Council resolutions).
201 See id.
at 33-39.
202 See id.
203 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art. 66(a), 1155

U.N.T.S. at 348; ELIAS, supra note 183, at 168-78 (describing the procedure for referral to
the World Court); HENKiN ET AL., supra note 14, at 469-70; EDwARD McWHMNNEY,
UNIED NATIONS LAW MAKING 73 (1984) (describing the provision as a "compromise"
between "natural law lawyers" and "legal positivists").
204 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally
ALLAN R. BREwEV-CARLAs, JUDICLAL REvIEw INCoMARATvE LAW (1989).
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Court appears to have accepted the existence of a few peremptory norms and
205
the notion that they may enjoy some higher status in international law.
Only two decades have passed sincejus cogens was pasted into the Vienna
Convention, and so it is too early to tell how great a role the doctrine will play
in the death of Treaty. Along with international promissory estoppel and the
binding unilateral promise of a state, jus cogens is one of the principal doctrinal
"signposts on the road." 206 Indeed, it carries more radical potential than any
doctrine in treaty law. Its assault on pacta sunt servanda, if it comes, will be
led by the developing world, which may assert thatjus cogens includes rights
to peace, self-determination, development, and a clean environment.2 07 These
states may advance the instrumentalist position that jus cogens protects the
interests of third parties and the world community in general, much as public
policy doctrine factors in externalities generated by private contract. 208 Under
this view, a treaty permitting seabed mining or trade in tuna might be invalid
because it damages the global environment in violation of peremptory norms of
international law. 209 Thus, jus cogens presents at least a potential threat to
traditional, contract-style Treaty. Moreover, the doctrine is here to stay.
Although there was less than universal enthusiasm for jus cogens among the
drafters of the Vienna Convention, few states voted against it. 2 10 Then and
since, states have been reluctant to criticize the doctrine for fear of being
branded scofflaws. 211 In short, jus cogens is politically correct.

205 See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970
LC.J. 4, 32 (Feb. 5) (speaking of norms binding erga omnes); id. at 304 (Ammoun, I.,

separate opinion) (asserting that self-determination is a peremptory norm); United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 40-41 (May 24)
(speaking of the "fundamental character" of the inviolability of diplomatic missions).
206 Allegheny College v. National Chautuaqua Bank, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927)
(Cardozo, I.) (dictum) (heralding the arrival of promissory estoppel).

207 Some sympathetic jurists have already started in this direction. See, e.g.,
Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.. at 304 (Ammoun, J., separate opinion) (asserting that selfdetermination is a jus cogens norm). These are the so-called Third Generation of human
rights-group rights that follow the First Generation of traditional individual rights and the

Second Generation of economic, social, and cultural rights. See generally LILLICH, supra
note 92, at 178-85.
208 See Alfred von Verdross, ForbiddenTreatiesin InternationalLaw, 31 AM. I. INT'L
L. 571,574 (1937) (describing the doctrine as an inquiry into the morality of treaties).

209 Cf. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938 & 1941) (holding
Canada responsible for trans-boundary environmental harm caused by a smelter in its
territory).
2 10
See SzTUCKI, supranote 197, at 156 (describing the vote).
211 See id. at 157 (describing reluctance to criticizejus cogens).
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There are other doctrinal signposts, other indications that the simple rule
pacta sunt servanda embraced by the London Declaration in the nineteenth
century is disintegrating. The most significant of these is the clausula rebus sic
stantibus, embodied now in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention. Article 62(1)
provides that an unforeseen "fundamental change in circumstances" may not be
invoked to terminate a treaty unless the existence of those circumstances
"constituted an essential basis of the consent" of the parties and the effect is
"radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the
treaty." 212 Article 62(2) adds that parties may not invoke changed
circumstances to terminate a boundary treaty and that parties may not invoke
changed circumstances brought about by their own breach. 213 Thus, in
grudging, negative language, the Vienna Convention has codified a narrow
version of the controversial old rule rebus sic stantibus. This a century after the
London Declaration rejected the doctrine in no uncertain terms.
The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is obviously in tension with pacta sunt
servanda. The drafters of Article 62 sought to minimize that tension by
"privileging" the latter doctrine, much as the Restatement of Contracts
"privileges" the doctrine of consideration. 214 Thus, the rebus doctrine is cast as
a narrow exception to the general rule that treaties will be obeyed. Article 62
starts from the presumption that changed circumstances will not justify
termination and then defines permissible grounds for termination in narrow
terms. The terminating state must show that the circumstances in question were
an "essential" basis and that obligations are now "radically" changed. This is a
high standard to meet, and it is not surprising that this new formula has rarely
if ever been invoked by an aggrieved state. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake
to write off Article 62 as a meaningless piece of rhetoric.
Article 62 serves an important role. In Grotius's day, when there was
215 it
doubt over whether treaties could bind a successor state or government,
2 12

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art. 62(1), 1155

U.N.T.S. at 346.
213 The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is analogous to the contract doctrines of
impracticability and frustration. Treaty law, like contract law, also recognizes impossibility

as a basis for invalidating a treaty. See I. Intreaty law, as in contract law, the doctrine of
impossibility is less controversial than the doctrine of impracticability. See ELIAs, supra

note 183, at 133 (asserting that the impossibility rule is a "matter of commonsense"). But cf.
POSNER, supra note 110, at 104-05 (suggesting that risk allocation, not physical
impossibility, is most relevant to discharge).
2 14

See Dalton, supra note 112, at 1087 (noting that consideration analysis is privileged

over reliance doctrine, which could equally well explain the result in most consideration
cases); c Bederman, supra note 65, at 39 (asserting that pacta sunt servanda can be

reconciled with Article 62 by narrowing the latter).
215 See supra part I (describing this doctrine and Grotius's criticism of it).
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was not so essential to protect later governments with a doctrine of rebus sic
stantibus. Treaty obligations lapsed anyway. But today's treaties, like today's
contracts, establish
and regulate relationships for generations. 216 They are
"relational." 217 Any relationship that lasts for generations is bound to undergo
changes. Article 62 provides a narrow escape hatch, a rather clumsy response
to inevitable change. What is odd about Article 62 is not that it recognizes the
possibility of termination, but that it ignores the possibility of modification.
Then again, treaty law has always permitted the parties freely to modify an
agreement. There is no international "pre-existing duty rule" because there is
218
no international doctrine of consideration.
Like jus cogens, rebus sic stantibus has rarely if ever been invoked in a
formal setting. As with jus cogens, it is difficult to predict what if any role
rebus sic stantibus will play in the death of Treaty. Again, the doctrine would
appear to have the most appeal for those with radical sensibilities, for it might
219
be used to attack treaty relationships established during the colonial era. It is
not as potentially destabilizing as jus cogens; Article 62 is quite narrowly
drawn, and it explicitly excludes boundary treaties from those subject to attack
on grounds of changed circumstances. 220 But it has a more prestigious pedigree
than jus cogens; rebus sic stantibus has existed for centuries, whereas jus
cogens is of more recent vintage. And rebus sic stantibus has a stronger claim
to legitimacy because it echoes the familiar contract doctrine of
impracticability. 221 It has none of the quasi-constitutional character of jus
cogens; it is a doctrine of positive law, not natural law.
2 16

See John P. Dawson, JudicialRevision of FrustratedContracts: The United States,

64 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1984).
217 Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Cassical,Neoclassical,and Relational ContractLaw, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854 (1978).
218 Compare Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902)
(invalidating modification of employment contract for lack of consideration) with Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art. 39, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 341 ("A treaty
may be amended by agreement between the parties.").
219 The same, of course, can be said for the doctrine of state succession, which could

conceivably permit successor states to disavow the unequal treaties concluded by the
predecessor state. See generally LUNG-FONG CHEN, STATE SUCCESSION RELATING TO
UNEQUAL TREATIES (1974).
2 20

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art. 62 (2)(a), 1155
U.N.T.S. at 347.
221 Cf. Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966)

(endorsing excuse for "changed circumstances" in compelling cases); U.C.C. § 2-614(1)
(1994) (excusing delay or nondelivery by seller if performance is made "impracticable" by

unforeseen circumstances involving a basic assumption of the parties).
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In sum, treaty doctrine, like contract doctrine, has steadily disintegrated
during the twentieth century. In Contract, the urge to sum up the law in a neat,
clean doctrine of bright lines-the doctrine of consideration-necessarily gave
way to the need to develop more flexible tools to deal with problems like
reliance on gratuitous promises. In Treaty, the urge to create bright lines,
which led to the London Declaration and a reaffirmation of the supremacy of
pacta sunt servanda, is now giving way to similar imperatives. The Vienna
Convention, like the Restatement of Contracts, is a collection of rules,
standards and exceptions, not just rules alone. In some instances, such as the
evolution of a doctrine of binding gratuitous promises, the result is an
international law better adapted to the needs of modem states. In such cases,
states will welcome the new diplomatic tools the law has made available. In
other instances, such as jus cogens, the new doctrinal exceptions threaten to
devour the rules that preceded them, and to lessen rather than enhance the
power of states to order their own affairs. Developments likejus cogens may
protect fundamental rights of states or individuals, but at a cost to state
sovereignty. The doctrinal death of Treaty, like the death of Contract, may not
be occasion for mourning, but neither is it occasion for unrestrained rejoicing.
III. DECLINE AND FALL
This part turns to the institutional demise of Treaty. It first considers the
extent to which Treaty has been eclipsed on the international plane by the rise
of new "legislative" sources of international law, such as the United Nations
Security Council. It then explores the rise of "legislative" alternatives to Treaty
in the domestic law of the United States. Finally, this part evaluates the
intersection of these developments-the "Americanization" of international
law.
A. The Supremacy Clause of the United Nations Chanterand the
Decline of Treaties in InternationalLaw
In the twentieth century, treaties have become increasingly multilateral.
Although a numerical majority of treaties are still bilateral, 222 the multilateral
treaty has played an increasingly significant role in international relations,
particularly in codifying and sometimes changing international law. Some
multilaterals have defined legal relations traditionally defined by bilateral treaty

222

Most U.S. treaties, for example, are bilateral treaties. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF

STATE, TREATIEs INFORCE (1992)

(providing a comprehensive list).
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or even custom, as in the case of diplomatic and consular immunities. 223
Others have addressed topics that were rarely addressed in bilateral treaties,
such as terrorism, human rights, women's rights, racial discrimination, the
rights of the child, and pollution. 224 Many of them purport to change the law
for a large number of states, even for the international community as a whole,
225
and are thus known as law-making treaties.
Multilaterals, in other words, more resemble legislation than private
contract. In substance, they affect the rights of most or all members of the
community. Even the process of their creation more resembles the untidy
scramble of legislation than the more orderly back-and-forth of contract
negotiation. Like a legislature, a multilateral conference establishes a chair,
226
delegates different matters to committees, and votes on the final product.
Furthermore, multilateral "legislation" is created by direct and not merely
representative democracy. At a multilateral conference, each state represents
itself.
The rise of the multilateral has not itself brought about the death of Treaty.
Multilaterals are, after all, treaties themselves. But the prevalence of
multilaterals is further evidence that classical Treaty, the pure expression of
sovereign will, has eroded on an institutional plane as well as a doctrinal one.
The two parties to a bilateral negotiation have the maximum possible control
over the outcome. They may be forced to compromise, but if differences are
too great, they can walk away altogether and leave no residue of new
international law behind them. Delegates to a multilateral conference, on the
other hand, may be forced to make more compromises to hold together a
consensus. A state may attempt to opt out of an objectionable provision through
a reservation, but only if it is not "incompatible with the object and purpose of
223 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
500 U.N.T.S. 95; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
596 U.N.T.S. 261.
224 See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Montreal
Convention]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985,
26 I.L.M. 1516.
225 . RESTATEIENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 Cmt. f (1987)
(noting that multilaterals are used for "general legislation").
226 Unlike a domestic legislature, however, a multilateral "legislature" often requires
that measures be adopted by consensus. See UNITED NATIONS, REVIEW OF THE
MULTILATERAL TREATY-MAKING PROCESS 48, U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER. B/21, U.N. Sales

No. E/F.83.V.8 (1985) (noting that within the United Nations there is a "widely held belief"
that "consensus rule" accelerates adoption of multilateral instruments).
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the agreement." 227 Even if the state refuses to sign the instrument, it may find
itself bound anyway, since a multilateral convention may constitute customary
law binding even on nonparties. 228 Multilaterals offer the promise of
codification and unification, but at a cost to state sovereignty; bilaterals
safeguard the interests of individual states, but at a cost to the orderly
development of international law.
Political factors suggest that the multilateral challenge to traditional
Treaty-the "legislatification" of international law-is not about to wither
away. Developing states, which easily outnumber industrialized states, have an
interest in multilateral treatymaking. Nonaligned states can make their voices
heard more easily if they stand together than if they attempt to go it alone.
Once a multilateral conference on an important topic has been convened, it is
politically difficult for an industrialized state to stay away. If the state refuses to
attend, or attends but refuses to accede, it will likely have to endure broadbased international criticism. 229 It is therefore not surprising that multilateral
conventions tend to be more radical than their bilateral counterparts. It was a
multilateral treaty, after all, that established the notion that human rights might
include "economic and social rights" such as a right to an "adequate standard
of living," housing, and health care. 230 Few if any bilateral treaties have ever
gone so far.
In a sense, however, the multilateral convention is an inherently
conservative form of law-making. The consensus that enhances the legitimacy
of multilaterals also discourages innovation. Not coincidentally, multilaterals
are very slow in the making. Like legislatures, multilateral conferences are not
designed to respond quickly to fast-breaking events. Multilaterals thus possess
227

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art. 19(c), 1155

U.N.T.S. at 337.
22 8
See Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in InternationalLaw, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1110 (1982); Wright, Custom as a Basisfor InternationalLaw in the PostWar World, 2 TEx. INT'L L.J. 147 (1966); cf. RESTATEMENr (THIRD) OF FoRnGuN
RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. f (1987) ("Multilateral agreements... are increasingly used
for general legislation, whether to make new law, as in human rights, or for codifying and
developing customary law, as in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ....").
229 The Rio conference on International Environmental Law is the most recent case in
point. See Keith Schneider, The Earth Summit; White House Snubs U.S. Envoy's Plea to
Sign Rio Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1992, at Al (reporting on foreign criticism of U.S.
refusal to sign biodiversity agreement).
230 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, arts. 11(1) (adequate standard of living and housing); 12 (health care), 993 U.N.T.S.
3. The Clinton Administration has recently stated that it will seek Senate advice and consent
to ratification of the Economic and Social Covenant. See Human Rights Are For All,
ChristopherTells Meeting, ATLATA J. & CoNST., June 15, 1993, at A10.
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both the strengths and weaknesses of any form of direct democracy. Not
surprisingly, the shortcomings of multilaterals have induced some states,
notably industrialized states, to seek alternatives.
The leading alternative right now is the United Nations Security Council. If
the multilateral conference is the forum for direct democracy, the Security
Council is the forum for representative democracy. Until the end of the Cold
War, the Council was an empty forum, paralyzed by vetoes of the United
States and the Soviet Union. Now the Cold War has thawed, and the five
permanent members of the Council and the ten rotating members routinely
make law for the rest of the world. That law is generally respected and
followed. Article 25 of the United Nations Charter obliges states to "carry out
the decisions" of the Council, and even in security matters-the Iraq-Kuwait
crisis being the obvious example-most states have indeed carried out the
Council's dictates. These developments mark a further decline in the
importance of bilateral treaty relations in maintaining the peace.
But the Security Council's recent rejuvenation has not been limited to
"security" in the traditional sense of deterring armed aggression. It has
ventured into such diverse matters as elections in Cambodia, starvation and
internal conflict in Somalia, human rights violations in Bosnia, and the
extradition of alleged terrorists from Libya. In doing so, it has sometimes
exercised its power to override existing treaties. Article 103 of the United
Nations Charter, the international Supremacy Clause, provides that Charter
obligations prevail in the event of a "conflict" between those obligations and
pre-existing treaty obligations. Thus, in 1992, the Council ordered Libya to
extradite to the United States or Great Britain two men charged with the 1988
bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. 23 1 Libya sought to
enjoin the Resolution in the International Court of Justice, arguing that the
Resolution was inconsistent with the Montreal Convention on aircraft sabotage,
which permits the requested state to extradite or submit the fugitives to its own
authorities for prosecution. 23 2 The Court rejected Libya's request for the
indication of provisional measures, citing Article 103 of the Charter:
"Whatever the situation previous to the adoption of [Resolution 748], the rights
claimed by Libya under the Montreal Convention cannot now be regarded as
231 See

S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg., at 2-3, U.N. Doc.

S/RES1748, reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 750 (1992).
232 See Montreal Convention, supra note 224, art. 7, 24 U.S.T. at 571, 974 U.N.T.S.
at 182. Libya also asserted, among other things, that its domestic law forbade the
extradition of Libyan nationals-a provision common in the constitutions of civil-law states.
See Letter from Ibrahim M. Bishari, Secretary of the People's Committee for Foreign
Liaison and Int'l Cooperation, to the Secretary-General (Mar. 2, 1992), in 31 I.L.M. 739,
740 (1992).
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appropriate for protection by the indication of provisional measures."233 Thus,
the Court reaffirmed the Security Council's power to override existing treaty
obligations.
This is not to suggest that the Security Council is poised to kill all treaties.
Notwithstanding the Libya case, it has shown little enthusiasm for the
wholesale rewriting of existing treaty obligations. Moreover, as I have
suggested elsewhere, there may be some limits to the Council's power to
override fundamental norms of international law, even when the Council
properly finds a threat or breach of the peace or act of aggression as required
by Article 39 of the Charter. 23 4 In my view, the World Court has a limited
power of judicial review to invalidate Council resolutions that are ultra vires of
the United Nations Charter. 23 5 As a practical matter, the Council could do a lot
of damage to existing treaty relations without coming close to its constitutional
limits; fortunately, it is not inclined to do so.
But the Council does seem quite willing to create new obligations for the
future where none existed. The war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
created by the Council in mid-1993, is the best case in point. The Council
ordered the establishment of a fully-staffed international tribunal to prosecute
"persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law"
in the former Yugoslavia. 23 6 The Council's resolution incorporated a detailed
forty-eight page report of the Secretary-General setting forth a complete statute

233 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention

Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.CJ. 114, 126-27
(Apr. 14) ("Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures").
For more on the many interesting facets of the Lockerbie decision, see Watson, supra
note 200, at 22-45; W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisisin the United Nations,
87 AM. J. INT'LL. 83 (1993).
23 4
See Watson, supra note 220, at 28-45. The decision in Lockerbie, though it
sustained the Council's negation of Libya's rights under the Convention and under
customary international law, nonetheless suggests that the Court is willing to exercise
judicial review of Security Council resolutions that violate fundamental aspects of state
sovereignty or intrude on fundamental norms of international law, such as jus cogens
principles. See id. at 22-28.
235 As I see it, the Court can and should exercise a limited "Jeffersonian" power of

judicial review in which the effect of invalidation extends only to the case before the Court.
See id. at 28-45. For more on Jeffersonian concepts of judicial review, see generally David
E. Engdahl, John Marshall's 'Jeffersonian' Concept of JudicialReview, 42 DUKE L.J 279

(1992).
236 S.C. Res. 827, supra note 91,

2.
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for the Court. 237 The Secretary-General sought to depict the measure as a
narrow one, noting that the resolution only covered crimes from 1991 on and
did not create an all-purpose international criminal court.238 But there is no
mistaking the significance of the event. In a single stroke, the Council-not a
multilateral conference-established the first significant international war
crimes tribunal since the Tokyo and Nuremberg tribunals of World War I,
tribunals that themselves were created by multilateral conferences.
The Secretary-General conceded that this procedure was a departure from
the "normal course of events," which would involve "the conclusion of a treaty
by which the States parties would establish a tribunal and approve its
statute." 239 He admitted that the treaty procedure would have permitted states
"fully to exercise their sovereign will, in particular whether they wish to
become parties to the treaty or not." 240 But he argued that the urgent need for
action on Bosnia justified a different procedure in this case, and that negotiation
and ratification of a treaty would take too long. 241 He asserted that the Council
had competence to act because the situation in Bosnia constituted a threat to the
peace, that the Council could establish a tribunal as a "subsidiary organ" under
Article 29 of the Charter, and that the Council would not be "purporting to
'legislate'" new humanitarian law. 242 Most interesting, he added that "[e]ven
then, there could be no guarantee that ratifications will be received from those
States which should be parties to the treaty ifit is to be tndy effective." 243
The Secretary-General is right that the situation in the former Yugoslavia
constitutes a threat to the peace justifying enforcement action by the Council
under Chapter VII of the Charter. A civil war that threatens to spill over into
neighboring states can easily constitute a threat to the peace, and in any event
the Balkan conflict can just as easily be characterized as an international
conflict-thus a breach of the peace-as a civil war. If the Council can invoke
Chapter VII against Southern Rhodesia for internal human rights violations, or
in respect of the human rights situation in Haiti, it can surely invoke Chapter
244
VII in the Balkan conflict.
237 See Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Paragraph2 of Security Council

Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doe. S/25704 (1993). Resolution 808
instructed the Secretary-General to prepare the report.

28 Seeid. atS.
239Id.
at 6.
240
1d. at 7.
241 See id.
242 Id.at 7-8.
243 Id. at 7 (emphasis

added).
244 See S.C. Res. 253, U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess., 1428th mtg., at 5, U.N. Doe.
S/RES/253 (1968). For a lively debate on the legality of the Rhodesia sanctions, compare
Myres McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The
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But the Secretary-General's remaining argument is less convincing. His
report concedes that a treaty would honor the sovereignty of states by allowing
them to decide whether to adhere to it, but then asserts that some states "should
be parties to the treaty if it is to be truly effective." 245 In effect, the report says

states should have the right to choose whether to adhere to a treaty, except
where a state's participation is essential to the purpose of the treaty. By this
logic, all states should be required to adhere to all multilateral treaties on
extradition, terrorism, narcotics, human rights, and the environment, because
without universal participation these instruments inevitably suffer. If so, Treaty
is truly dead, at least if Treaty embraces international agreements formed by
the consent of states.
In any event, one wonders precisely what states the Secretary-General
thought should be party to a treaty establishing a war crimes tribunal. No doubt
he has in mind Serbia and perhaps Croatia. Is Serbia any more likely to hand
over Serb war criminals because the war crimes tribunal was authorized by the
Security Council than by treaty? The Secretary-General's reply is that Serbia
and other states are now legally obliged to "cooperate flly" with the
tribunal. 246 Another supporter of an ad hoc tribunal has also suggested that the
"added factor of a Security Council demand for cooperation could provide the
impetus needed to prosecute these crimes in national tribunals" 247-that is, in
Serbian courts. But what if Serbia and other states flout their new legal
obligations to the tribunal? Even supporters of the ad hoc approach concede
that the tribunal will probably not accomplish much but argue that the risks are
24 8
outweighed by the moral implications of doing nothing.

In the end, the perceived need for quick action, not a desire to impose a
legal obligation of cooperation on Yugoslavia and other states, was
undoubtedly the most important reason that the Security Council decided to
bypass the traditional multilateral conference and set up an ad hoc tribunal
itself. In this case, the Security Council was indeed able to move quicker than
an international conference, at least in establishing a statute and authorizing the
appointment of judges and other personnel. If the tribunal can bring itself into
Lawfidness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-19 (1968) (supporting
sanctions) with Dean Acheson, The Arrogance ofInternationalLawyers, 2 INT'L LAW. 591,
591-99 (1968) (opposing them). For these and other useful materials on sanctions and
southern Africa, see generally RiCIUaD B. LILLICii & FRANK C. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGrrs 388-484 (1991).

245 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 237, at 7.
246 S.C. Res. 827, supra note 91, 4.
247

Theodor Meron, The Casefor War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, 72 FOREIGN AFF.

122 (1993).

248 See id. at 132-33, 135.
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operation within a reasonable time, and if it can score one or two early
successes, then the Council's action may seem well-justified.
In the future, however, the Council would do well to remember that
multilateral deliberation has its own advantages. If one hundred or more states
take the time and trouble to negotiate a statute for a war crimes tribunal, they
are likely to have a greater political stake in its success than if the tribunal is
imposed on them from above by the fifteen members of the Security Council.
To be sure, the Secretary-General did collect opinions from many states and the
composition and competence of the ad hoe tribunal, and it appears to have
incorporated many suggestions into its report. But this process inevitably lacks
the give-and-take of an in-person negotiation, and the end result is bound to
leave some states feeling like they were shut out of the process. The need for
inclusiveness is not especially acute in a case like the Yugolsavia war crimes
tribunal, since relatively few states will have a direct stake in its deliberations.
But if and when the world community seeks to create a permanent war crimes
tribunal, or an international criminal court with broad jurisdiction, all states
should be included in the negotiations.
Direct democracy may not work in modem nation-states, even in
democratic republics, which are typically composed of millions of constituents
and must rely on elected representatives to confront an endless series of issues,
great and small. But the international community is a tiny one, comprising
fewer than two hundred states, and when it addresses major issues that will
affect most members for a long period of time, that community can still afford
the luxury of counting every member's vote. There is a time and a place for
representative democracy on the international plane; if quick or forceful action
is required, the Security Council has shown that it can respond effectively. But
a stable international order requires a broader base. The greatest challenge for
international law is enforcing its norms against member states. Consent of the
governed-through multilateral "legislation," or even the homely bilateral
treaty-is the best hope for achieving this goal.
B. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and the
Decline of Treaties in United States Law
Treaty has died a thousand deaths in United States law. The self-executing
treaty doctrine has ensured that few, if any, treaties have the force of law
within the United States, and that fewer still may be invoked by private
parties. 249 The Senate has given its advice and consent to treaties at a
249 See generally Paust,supra note 6 (criticizing the doctrine). It should also be noted
that the doctrine exists, in some form or another, in the municipal law of many other states.

19941

THE DEATH OF TREA7Y

consistently slow pace. Unable to absorb all the international agreements signed
by the executive branch each year, our legal system has given birth to so-called
"executive agreements" that are reported to but not reviewed by Congress.25O
Understandings, declarations and reservations clutter every multilateral
treaty. 25 1 Our executive branch has even experimented with imaginative
"reinterpretations" of treaties at odds with the understanding originally
22
presented to the Senate. 5
The self-executing treaty doctrine is the single biggest culprit. It has
rewritten the Supremacy Clause, which provides that "all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land." 25 3 The doctrine now holds that a treaty is the
"supreme Law of the Land" only when it is self-executing. A treaty is non-selfexecuting, and thus not operative as supreme law, if it "manifests an intention"
that it not become effective as domestic law without implementing legislation.
Thus, a treaty is non-self-executing if the Senate must give consent, if Congress
by resolution requires implementing legislation, or if implementing legislation
is "constitutionally required." 254 For example, a treaty that purports to commit
the United States to provide foreign aid to another state would not be selfexecuting because only Congress has the constitutional authority to make
appropriations; some congressional implementing legislation would be
required. A treaty forbidding discrimination against Japanese nationals has been
held to be self-executing; the human rights provisions of the United Nations
Charter have been held to be non-self-executing. 25 5
Notwithstanding the absolute language of the Supremacy Clause, some
version of the self-executing treaty doctrine is inevitable. It is not surprising
that many other states have established variants of the self-executing treaty
doctrine. 256 Some treaties, like treaties calling for appropriations, will always
See generally U.K. NAT'L COMM. OF COMP. LAw, THE EFFEcr OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC

LAW (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987).
250
See L. MARGOLIS, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN FOREIGN
POLICY 108 (1985), quoted in CARTER& TRIMBLE, supra note 82, at 169.
251 See, e.g., Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, S. EXEC. REP. No. 23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-10 (1992) (adding five
reservations, five understandings, four declarations and one "proviso" to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171).
252
See sources cited supra note 7.
253

U.S. CONST. art. VI.
254 RESTATEMENT (rHIRD) OFFOREIGNRELATIONS LAW § 111(4) (1987).

255 Compare Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (treaty forbidding
discrimination) with Sei Fujii v. California, 242 P.2d 617 (1952) (U.N. Charter).
256 See THE EFFECr OF TREATIES IN DOMESTC LAW, supra note 249, at xxiv-xxviii
(providing an overview).
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require legislative implementation. If it were otherwise, the President could use
the treaty power to put Congress out of business. For example, the President
could enter into a treaty acknowledging a human right to housing and requiring
massive state expenditures on public housing, and then use the treaty as
authority for appropriating the requisite funds unilaterally. Conversely, the
President could enter into a treaty requiring a higher tax rate to support
universal health care and then simply order the Internal Revenue Service to
start enforcing the higher rate.
One might argue that these results would be tolerable if the Senate always
had the opportunity to pass on the treaty before it became law. Currently, the
Senate gives its advice and consent to only a tiny minority of international
agreements, known as "treaties"; the majority of international agreements,
known as "executive agreements," are merely reported to the Congress under
the Case Act. 257 A literal interpretation of the Treaty Clause would require
Senate approval of each and every such agreement, for the Constitution makes
no mention of executive agreements that can be merely reported to
Congress258-just as the Supremacy Clause makes no mention of non-selfexecuting treaties. The logical extension of this argument proposes that if the
Senate really passed on every treaty, then the self-executing treaty doctrine
could be abolished because every treaty would become the law of the land upon
ratification. The Senate would have a chance to pass on the President's treaty
requiring appropriations for housing or raising taxes for health care, and the
constitutional balance of power would be preserved. In this way, an absolute
reading of the Treaty Clause could facilitate an absolute reading of the
Supremacy Clause.
The obvious reply to the determined interpretivist is that the modern Senate
is simply incapable of fulfilling a duty to give advice and consent to each and
every international agreement, since the United States now enters into hundreds
of agreements every year, far more than the Framers envisioned and far more
than even an efficient Senate could handle. The Congress cannot possibly pass
on every treaty before it becomes law, and therefore it is inappropriate to read

257

The Case Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1988), requires that the Secretary of State
transmit the text of any international agreement, "other than a treaty," to the Congress
within 60 days after it has entered into force. Most international agreements are reported to
Congress under the Case Act; the Senate gives its "Advice and Consent" to only a tiny
minority of full-fledged "treaties." See MARGOLIS, supra note 250, at 108, quoted in
CARTER & TRIMBLE, supranote 82, at 169 (noting that executive agreements far outnumber
treaties).
258 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
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the Supremacy Clause literally-that is, to hold that all treaties are
automatically the "law of the land."259

Even if one concedes the foregoing proposition, which is not altogether
self-evident, one might still argue that treaties should always become the law of
the land even if the Senate does not always approve them. If a treaty became
law without express congressional consent, the Congress would still retain the
power to enact legislation nullifying the President's treaties-provided, of
course, that the President signed such legislation or Congress overrode the
President's veto. 260 But this last-ditch power of repeal would hardly comfort
Congress, which would understandably regard the President's enhanced treaty
power as a major change in the constitutional balance of power.
More importantly, as several authorities have pointed out, such a regime
seems inconsistent with the constitutional text, which appears to grant some
powers exclusively to Congress. 261 Thus, "[n]o Money shall be drawn from
262
the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."
Furthermore, "[a]Ul Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives. "2 -63 Congress, in other words, has the exclusive power to tax
and spend, shared with the Executive only insofar as the President may sign or
veto bills to tax and spend. In areas in which Congress has only concurrent

259 Of course, all treaties and international agreements bind the United States on the

international plane, regardless of whether they are binding as a matter of domestic United
States law. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art. 27, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 339 ("A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification

for its failure to perform a treaty."). Put another way, it is possible for the United States to
be bound on the international plane but not on the domestic (or "municipal") plane. See
generally Louis HENKN, FOREIGN AFFAiRS AND THF CONSTrrUTION 156-62 (1972)
(describing the self-executing treaty doctrine).
2 60
See United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1465

(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that Congress may override treaties and other forms of
international law, but must do so clearly).
261 "There are certain grants of authority to Congress which are, by their very terms,
exclusive. In these areas, the treaty-making power and the power of Congress are not

concurrent; rather, the only department of the federal government authorized to take action
is the Congress." Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 907 (1978), quoted in Paust, supra note 6, at 779.
262 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. "[The Constitution provides only one methodcongressional enactment-for the appropriation of money." Edwards, 580 F.2d at 1058.
263 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. This provision "appears, by reason of the restrictive
language used, to prohibit the use of the treaty power to impose taxes." Edwards, 580 F.2d

at 1058.
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power, such as the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, a treaty
264
can and should operate as law without implementing legislation.
It has been suggested that even the two provisions quoted above are not
exclusive grants of power to Congress. 26 5 "Just because all 'Bills' for raising

revenue shall originate in the House, it does not follow that revenue may be
raised in no other way." 266 Indeed, self-executing treaties may affect tariffs,
most-favored-nation status, and other laws that do raise revenue. 267 But it is
quite another thing to suggest that treaties can directly affect tax rates; until the
Sixteenth Amendment was adopted in 1913, even Congress lacked the power to
collect taxes without apportionment. 268 In addition, it has been suggested that
the requirement of "Appropriations made by Law" does not explicitly limit
2 69
itself to congressionalappropriations or to "Law" made only by Congress.
This assertion must overcome the weight of two hundred years of practice.
Early in our history, the House of Representatives clung to the position that it
had the right to decide whether to appropriate funds to implement a treaty,
rejecting the proposition that once a treaty called for appropriations, the
270
Congress was legally bound to make the appropriation.
26 4

See Paust, supra note 6, at 780 (asserting that implementing legislation should be
required only where congressional power is exclusive); Edwards, 580 F.2d at 1057-58,
quoted in Paust, supra note 6, at 778 (asserting that the foreign commerce power is not
exclusive).
As Professor Paust points out, moreover, even an unimplemented non-self-executing
treaty has some domestic legal effect, for it may have value as an interpretive tool. See
Paust, supra note 6, at 781-82.
265 See id. at 780-81.
266 Id. at 780.
26 7
See RESTATEMrNT (rH]RD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 cmt. i (1987).
268 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes... without apportionment among the several States.").
26 9

Past, supra note 6, at 781.
270 See, e.g., 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 771 (1796), quoted in HENKIN, supra note 259,

at 161-62 (resolving that the House had the right to approve or reject appropriations to
implement the Jay Treaty); see also Turner v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 24 F.
Cas. 344 (C.C.D. Mich. 1852) (No. 14,251), cited in HENIN, supra note 259, at 406 n.98.
It is also unlikely that a treaty establishing criminal penalties can be self-executing. It is
settled constitutional law that there is no federal common law of crimes-that the Congress
must enact a federal criminal code. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32 (1812). The text of the Constitution seems to confirm that this rule applies to
treaty-made crimes, as well. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (providing that Congress
shall have the power to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high
Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations"). For more on this question, see the
materials cited in HENKIN, supra note 259, at 406-07 n.99.
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Nonetheless, much congressional power can and should be shared with the
Executive. 27 1 We know that a treaty forbidding discrimination can be selfexecuting, 272 which implies that the congressional commerce power, or
perhaps its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, is not exclusive. The
presumption should be that a treaty is self-executing unless its text or the
Constitution requires otherwise-not the other way around, as is the case now.
Such a presumption would come closer to the absolute command of the
Supremacy Clause, and it would help restore Treaty to its rightful place as a
significant source of law for the republic.
Assuming that some treaties must be non-self-executing, to what extent is
the Congress morally or legally bound to enact implementing legislation to
bring treaties into effect? The Framers were divided on this question.
Alexander Hamilton thought that the House of Representatives has "no moral
power to refuse the execution of a treaty which is not contrary to the
Constitution," and indeed "no legal power to refuse its execution because it is
a law." 2 73 On the other hand, the early House of Representatives, including
Representative James Madison, resolved that "it is the Constitutional right and
duty of the House of Representatives, in all such cases, to deliberate on the
expediency or inexpediency of carrying such Treaty into effect... ."274 As
Professor Henkin suggests, Hamilton's proposal for a legal duty to implement
might be more efficient, but Madison's view is more consistent with the
Framers' general preference for checks and balances. 275 Still, there is much to
be said for Hamilton's suggestion that Congress has a moral duty to implement
treaties, at least when the treaty has already received congressional blessing in
the form of Senate advice and consent to ratification. The Supremacy Clause
clearly contemplates that treaties would be the "supreme law of the land" upon
Senate advice and consent. Perhaps Congress should be held politically
accountable when it prevents this from happening.
In most cases, however, the Senate never gives its advice and consent to
anything, since most international agreements of the United States are
considered executive agreements rather than full-fledged treaties. In such
271 See Paust, supra note 6, at 777 n.102; Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1057, 105758 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978).

272 Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
273 WoRKs oi ALEXANDER HAMILTON 566 (J.C. Hamilton ed., 1851), quoted in
HEN<IN, supra note 259, at 161 (emphasis added).
274 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 771 (1796), quoted in HENiN, supra note 259, at 161-62.
This debate revolved around implementation of the controversial Jay Treaty to regulate
relations with Britain. The treaty passed the House by a narrow margin. See HENKIN, supra
note 259, at 16-62.
275
See id. at 162.
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instances, the case for careful congressional deliberation is much stronger,
since the process of congressional implementation represents the only
congressional input on the agreement. Of course, the Constitution does not
distinguish between treaties and executive agreements, but from early on it has
been United States practice to permit the Executive to negotiate some
agreements without the Senate's advice and consent. 276 These agreements stem
from authority granted by Congress, or previous treaties, or even from the
Executive's sole authority. 277 This practice has practicality on its side; the
Senate is not well-equipped to give advice and consent to the many
27 8
international agreements concluded by the Executive.
It is doubtless too late to suggest that this time-honored habit violates the
Constitution. The inevitable consequence, however, has been a further
devaluation of international agreements in United States law. Although it
appears that executive agreements can be self-executing, 279 many will still

require implementing legislation. Indeed, there is bound to be greater political
pressure for Congress to deliberate carefully over implementing legislation-in
effect, to consider an agreement de novo-when the Senate has not passed on
the agreement. Thus, the fate of the North American Free Trade Agreement280
(NAFTA) rested in the hands of both Houses of Congress, not the President
"with the Advice and Consent of the Senate." 281 It is as if the Articles of
Confederation, under which the Congress directed the negotiation of treaties,
had never been replaced by a federal constitution with explicit separation of the
treaty powers. Perhaps we should drop the pretense that the Executive
negotiates important international agreements like NAFTA, for without
congressional implementing legislation they are doomed. Perhaps the President
should first seek the necessary legislation, or at least some form of
congressional authorization, before spending large amounts of time and money
negotiating a controversial international agreement. Perhaps we should
explicitly recognize that Legislation is all that matters, and that Treaty is, at
long last, dead.

276 See id. at 173-84.
277 See id.

278 See itd. at 173 (noting that executive agreements far outnumber full-fledged
treaties).
279 See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
2 80

North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32

LL.M. 605.
281 U.S. CoNST. art. 1I, § 2, cl. 2.
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C. Burialor Resurrection? The Americanization of InternationalLaw
The United States probably has more influence over international law than
any other state in the world. More often than not, the United States is the
leader in the Security Council. 282 It was, after all, the United States that led the
Allied Coalition into the Gulf War, which contributed a slew of Council
resolutions on everything from diplomatic relations to the use of force to the
corpus of international law. The United States is certainly one of the most
important delegations at most multilateral law-making conferences. The United
Nations itself, which was negotiated on the American West Coast and is
headquartered on the East Coast, was in part a product of the American
imagination.
Even bilateral treaties of the United States sometimes influence the
direction of international law. American bilaterals often reflect more
experimentation than multilaterals to which the United States is party. The
1985 U.S.-U.K. supplemental extradition treaty283 is a case in point. That
agreement restricted the scope of the traditional "political offense" exception to
extradition, thereby making it more difficult for terrorists to avoid
extradition. 284 This provision was unprecedented in extradition law, and it laid
the foundation for a stronger international response to terrorism. Other
examples include the U.S.-China agreement prohibiting export of products
made by prison labor, 285 treaties for mutual legal assistance in criminal
287
cases, 286 and Bilateral Investment Treaties.
Even unilateral United States practice has helped create new international
law. Our Constitution is a model for the constitutions of newly independent
282 "There is no question about the identity of P-i." Reisman, supra note 233, at 97.

The term "P-5" or "Perm-5" refers to the Permanent Five members of the Security
Council. Id.
283 Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty, June 25, 1985, U.S.U.K., 24 I.L.M. 1105.
284
Id. art. 1. At the same time, the parties relaxed the "rule of non-inquiry" that
traditionally barred examination of the requesting state's legal system, thereby permitting
fugitives to challenge extradition by pointing to human rights violations in the requesting
state.
285
Memorandum of Understanding on Prohibiting Import and Export Trade in Prison
Labor Products, Aug. 7, 1992, China-U.S., 31 I.L.M. 1071.
286 See, e.g., Treaty Concerning The Grand Cayman Islands Relating to Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters, July 3, 1986, U.S.-U.K., S. TREATY Doe. No. 8, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
287 See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investments, Sept. 29, 1982, U.S.-Egypt, 21 I.L.M. 927.
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states and even for multilateral human rights treaties. 288 Indeed, the Clinton
Administration pushes openly-as well it should-for universal norms of
human rights that largely resemble those enshrined in our own Bill of
Rights.289 The United Nations Sales Convention reflects the influence of our
innovative Uniform Commercial Code.290 To be sure, other states have helped
chart the course of international law, and no one state alone can create
customary international law, which grows out of a "general and consistent
practice" of states. 291 But no state has had as much influence for so long as the
United States. International lawyers are accustomed to speaking of the
"reception" of international law into domestic legal systems. 292 In our era,
however, the process has reversed itself: the domestic law of the United States
(and, less frequently, of other states) is now "received" into international law,
at least on occasion.
Americanization also extends to the domestic law of foreign states. The
United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 293 which codifies important
principles of international law, has generated a significant body of law on
sovereign immunity, law that is bound to influence foreign tribunals and
legislatures. 294 Even our Constitution and Bill of Rights have influenced the
288 See Ronald St. J. MacDonald, Book Review, 86 AM. I. INT'L L. 192, 196 (1992)

(noting that the U.S. Constitution has had "profound influence" on constitutionalism and
human rights abroad).
289 See Hwnan Rights Are ForAll, ChristopherTells Meeting, supra note 230, at A10.
290 See S. TREATY Doc. 9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., at 22 (1983), reprintedin 19 I.L.M.

668 (reprinting Secretary of State Shultz's view that the Convention "embodies the
substance of many of the important provisions of the U.C.C. and is generally consistent
with its approach and methods"). But cf. Note, Unification and Uncertainty: 7he United

Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1984, 1999 (1984) (arguing that the U.C.C. is not "substantially similar" to foreign
commercial codes).

Of course, the Uniform Commercial Code and other sources of American law owe
much to foreign sources. For an interesting discussion along these lines, see James
Whitman, Note, Commwercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's German
Sourcesforthe Unifonn Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156 (1987).
291 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (1987).
292 See, e.g., IAN BROWNLM, PRPjNciPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 50-52 (4th

ed. 1990) (describing the process of "reception" or "incorporation" of international law into
municipal law). The self-executing treaty doctrine is one of many mechanisms designed to
facilitate (or impede, as the case may be) the reception of international law into domestic
law. See suprapart ILB.
293 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391(f, 1441(d), 1602-11 (1992).
294 See, e.g., Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428

(1989); cf. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(d), 59 Stat.
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development of foreign constitutions. 295 These developments are one more step
removed from the traditional concept of "reception" of international law: here,
one country's domestic law is received into that of another.
In many ways these are welcome developments. Constitutionalism,
American and otherwise, still has much to offer to a system of world
government that is still in its infancy. Moreover, federal states like the United
States have experience in codification and unification of law, as with the
Uniform Commercial Code. In addition, this new process of reception offers
more hope for a stable international order than any regime that depends on
enforcement of treaties. If all states enacted human rights norms, including the
rule of law, into positive law, human rights might be better enforced than they
are now.

Obviously, however, the domination of international law by one state,
however well-intentioned, could also be characterized as legal and moral
imperialism. Some American practice is clearly unacceptable to the
international community. Much debate on the permissible use of force centers
on American military actions. In some cases, as in Iraq and Somalia, United
States leadership has molded a new consensus about the acceptable limits of the
use of force. In others, as in Vietnam, Grenada and Panama, United States
military intervention has been more controversial and has created less certain
precedents. 296 This is also the case in law enforcement. On the one hand,
American efforts to establish new methods of evidence-sharing have culminated
in a wave of interest in Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, which provide a
streamlined alternative to letters rogatory. 297 On the other hand, United States
1095, T.S. No. 993 (providing that the World Court shall apply "judicial decisions" as
"subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law").
295 See MacDonald, supra note 288, at 196 (reviewing CoNsTrrurIoNALIsM AND
RIGHTS (Louis Henkin & Albert I. Rosenthal eds., 1990)) (noting that contributors to the
book are in "unanimous" agreement that "the U.S. Constitution has had profound influence
around the world").
Not all such influence has been positive. One commentator argues that de jure racial
segregation in the United States helped justify apartheid in South Africa in the 1940s and
1950s. See John Dugard, Toward Racial Justice in South AfVica, in CONSTrrUTIONALIsM
AND RIGHTS, supra, at 367-68. Another commentator suggests that American notions of
substantive due process have distorted foreign constitutionalism. See Anthony Ogus,
Property Rights and Freedom of Economic Activity, in CONSTrrUTiONALiSM AND RIGHTS,
supra, at 146.
296 See, e.g., Louis HENmIN, supra note 10, at 304-08 (describing conflicting views
about the legality of the U.S. effort in Vietnam); Maechling, Washington's illegalInvasion,
FOREIGN POLICY, Summer 1990, at 113 (criticizing the invasion of Panama).
297 Letters rogatory, or letters of request, are the traditional means by which a court in
one state seeks judicial assistance from a court in a foreign state. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
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efforts to enforce criminal laws extraterritorially have met with furious
resistance from abroad. Thus, the United States has earned mainly international
scorn for kidnapping a fugitive from Mexico, 298 seizing and imprisoning
General Manuel Noriega for drug-related crimes committed while leader of
Panama, 29 9 and attempting to apply United States export laws to foreign-

incorporated subsidiaries of United States corporations. 3°° Our closest allies
often regard differences over extraterritoriality as the worst aspect of their
relations with the United States.30 1 Nonetheless, Congress and the Executive
appear to have boundless enthusiasm for extraterritoriality, and the judicial
branch is generally prepared to defer to it.
Until recently, most extraterritorial enactments, and thus most debate on
extraterritoriality, focused on civil antitrust enforcement as well as criminal
activity by and against Americans abroad, and even extraterritorial conduct not
involving Americans at all. Congress has outlawed all manner of drug crimes

§ 1782 (1992) (authorizing U.S. courts to use letters rogatory). The requesting state may
respond as a matter of comity, but it is not legally obliged to do so. See SENATE COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, LEGiS. AcrIvrIms REP., S. REP. No. 30, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 15
(1991) (describing the shortcomings of letters rogatory). The Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty (MLAT) by contrast, imposes a legal obligation on the requested state to comply,
and it contemplates much quicker action. See id. at 15-17.
The U.S. government has concluded at least a dozen MLATs, most of which have now
entered into force. For a list of U.S. MLATs, see Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad:
The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal Jurisdicton, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 41, 75 n.194
(1992).
298 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
299 See United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
300 See CARTER& TRIMBLE, supranote 82, at 748-59 (collecting relevant materials).
What is most odd about U.S. extraterritorial practice is that the United States has
traditionally shied away from the exercise of relatively uncontroversial forms of
extraterritoriality such as nationality jurisdiction. See generally Watson, supra note 297
(arguing that Americans who commit serious crimes abroad occasionally go free because
the United States lacks nationality-based jurisdiction to prosecute when the territorial state
cannot or will not prosecute). Even the exercise of passive personality jurisdiction, only
now tentatively embraced by the United States, would seem less controversial than, for
example, the Mexican kidnapping. See Geoffrey R. Watson, The Passive Personality
Principle, 28 TEx. INT'L L.J. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Watson, Passive Personality] (arguing
that the United States should exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the victim's American
nationality, but only if the other interested sovereigns decline to prosecute).
301 See, e.g., John Kennedy, Rich Papers'Availability is UnderDebate, WASH. POST,
Sept. 21, 1983, at F1 (reporting Swiss complaints about U.S. efforts to apply U.S. law in
Switzerland).
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committed abroad, as well as terrorism and other serious offenses. 30 2 Many

commentators have criticized these laws as unwarranted intrusions on foreign
sovereignty. 30 3 I have elsewhere endorsed jurisdiction based on the nationality
of either the victim or the offender, so long as local officials have the first
304

opportunity to prosecute.
Interestingly, however, the debate on extraterritoriality now extends to
human rights. Recent developments in United States human rights law suggest
that the Americanization of international law is proceeding apace. Because of
the importance of these developments, they will be considered in some detail.30 5
In 1992, Congress enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act (I'VPA),
establishing a civil cause of action for money damages against any individual
who, under color of foreign law, subjects an individual to "torture" or
"extrajudicial killing." 30 6 Torture is defined broadly to include various forms
of physical and mental coercion, 30 7 and the statute applies regardless of where

the acts occurred. 308 The Act requires that plaintiffs exhaust "adequate and
available remedies" where the conduct occurred, and it imposes a ten-year
309
statute of limitations.
302

See generally INTERNATIONAL CRMNAL LAw: A GuIDE TO U.S. PRAcrIcE AND

PROCEDURE (Ved P. Nanda & M. CherifBassiouni eds., 1987).
303 See, e.g., DMTER LANGE & GARY BORN, THE EXTRATERRrrORIAL APPLICATION OF

NATIONAL LAws 36-37 (1987) (contrasting U.S. efforts to assert jurisdiction based on
"effects" in U.S. territory with those countries requiring a closer jurisdictional nexus).
304 See Watson, Passive Personality,supra note 300; Watson, supra note 297, at 7083.
305 Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)
[hereinafter TVPA].
306
Id. § 2(a).
30 7
See id. § 3(b).
30 8
The text of the statute clearly implies that it is designed to have extraterritorial
effect. It provides a cause of action only against individuals who act under authority or color
of law of a "foreign nation." Id. § 2(a). Such conduct might occasionally take place within
the United States, as when a foreigner assassinates a foreign national within the United
States. See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1125 (1985) (murder of former Chilean Ambassador in Washington, D.C.). Ordinarily
one would expect most foreign-sponsored torture to take place on foreign soil. In addition,
the TVPA speaks of exhaustion of remedies "in the place" in which the conduct occurred.
Id. § 2(b). Moreover, the legislative history of the statute repeatedly indicates that it is
intended to apply extraterritorially. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 249, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1991) (noting that TVPA would provide a remedy for those "tortured abroad."). Thus, the
logic and legislative history of the statute plainly override the presumption that statutes do
not have extraterritorial effect. See The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925).
309 TVPA, supranote 305, § 2(b)-(c).
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The Act broadens the Alien Tort Claims Statute, a part of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 that provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction
over any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 310 The Alien Tort Statute lay
dormant until 1980, when the Second Circuit held in Filartigav. Pena-IralaII
that the statute permitted a Paraguayan national to sue another Paraguayan in
United States district court for torture committed in Paraguay, even though the
conduct took place entirely outside the United States. Filartigais still good law
today, but some authorities have questioned its rationale, arguing that the Alien
Tort Statute did not explicitly create a private cause of action and calling on
Congress to clarify the matter. 3 12 The TVPA is designed to do just that. It now
ensures that any plaintiff, not just an "alien," may bring suit in the United
States for the most serious torts committed abroad-torture and extrajudicial
killing.

As interpreted by Filartiga,the Alien Tort Statute is a classic example of
the "moral imperialism" so readily denounced by the cultural relativists. 313
True enough, Filartigarepresents Americanization of international law, for it
3 10

Judiciary Act of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992). The rather cryptic wording of the

Alien Tort Statute raises many interesting questions. Why does the statute provide a civil
action for aliens but not for U.S. citizens? Why did it fall into desuetude for two centuries?
For a useful study of these and other issues, see generally Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien
Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. I. INT'L L. 461
(1989).
311 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980).
3 12
See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985) (Bork, L, concurring). Others have argued that the Statute
does create a cause of action, but only against the United States or its officers-that it was
designed to provide foreign nationals (or perhaps just foreign ambassadors) a federal
remedy for torts committed by Americans against foreign nationals in order to protect them
from denial of justice in state courts. See id. at 783 (Edwards, J., concurring); William R.
Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdictionover Torts Comdtted in Violation of the
Law ofNations, 18 CONN. L. REv. 467, 489-98 (1986); Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort
Statute and the Foundingofthe Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (1988).
313 See, e.g., CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAws, bk. I, ch.
3,
12-14 (Thomas Nugent trans., 6th ed. 1756) (endorsing relativism), cited in Paul D.
Carrington, Butterfly Effects: The PossibilitiesofLaw Teaching in a Democracy, 41 DuKE
L.J. 741, 743 (1992). The tension between relativism and universalism has generated an
avalanche of writing. See, e.g., JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY

AND PRAcIcE 107-60 (1989); Douglas Lee Donoho, Relativism Versus Universalism in
Human Rights: The Search for Meaningfid Standards, 27 STAN. I. INT'L L. 345 (1991);
Stanley Fish, The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, in THE FATE OF LAw 159
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991); P. Schmidt, Some Criticisms of Cultural
Relativism, 52 J. PHIL. 780, 788 (1955).
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provides a new, American remedy for a violation of international law and in
the process also helps define the substantive rights at stake.314 For those who
incline toward universal norms of human rights, this result is not altogether
unwelcome. The Alien Tort Statute merely enforces treaties and customary law
already in force; if a foreign state wishes to avoid its effect, that state can
renounce the relevant treaties and international law defining human rights. In
any event, the opponents of Filartigahave little to fear. Decisions following
Filartigaare bound to be infrequent because the defendant (and the defendant's
assets) will seldom be present in the United States.
Unlike the Alien Tort Statute, the TVPA was supposedly designed to
"carry out the intent" 315 of a treaty-the recently-ratified Torture
Convention. 316 The legislative history of the statute notes that the Torture
Convention obliges state parties to ensure that torturers are "held legally
accountable" for their acts. 317 The framers of the statute thus sought to cloak it
in the legitimizing mantle of a treaty. According to Congress, the TVPA is not
an effort to Americanize international law unilaterally; it merely implements a
treaty adopted by a democratic gathering of states.
The truth, naturally, is not so simple. The Torture Convention does oblige
parties to "ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains
redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate
compensation .... "318 But as the Bush Administration pointed out in hearings
on the TVPA, the negotiating history of the Convention suggests that this
provision was intended to provide a cause of action for torture within the
territory of state parties, not torture on foreign soil. 3 19 The Administration
explained that the Torture Convention supposedly included an "express
reference to that effect" that was "deleted, evidently, by a mistake in the
printed version."320 The Administration contended that adoption of the TVPA
might be perceived by other countries as "inconsistent with the convention and
overreaching on our part." 321 It argued instead that the United States should
3 14

See also Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (applying the

Alien Tort Statute to tort claims for disappearance and cruel and inhuman treatment).
315 S.REP. No. 249, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1991).

316 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, mo'fied, 24 I.L.M. 535 [hereinafter Torture
Convention].
317 S.REP. No. 249, 102d Cong.,lst Seas. 3 (1991).
318 Torture Convention, supra note 316, art
. 14(1).
3 19

See Toture Victim Protection Act of 1989: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on

Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Seas.

19 (1990) (testimony of David P. Stewart, Ass't Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State).
320 Id.

321 Id. at 20.
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focus on ratifying and implementing the actual terms of the Torture
Convention, which oblige states to extradite or prosecute alleged torturers. 322
The Senators present at the TVPA hearings did not share the
Administration's concern that the statute exceeded the limits of the Torture
Convention. Senator Simon first pointed out that some states inevitably would
not ratify or implement the Torture Convention, implying that the TVPA could
fill this gap. 3 23 The Administration responded by noting that the TVPA would
not fill the gap because it would usually result in an "empty judgment." 3 24
Like Senator Simon, Senator Specter saw the TVPA as a useful complement to
the Torture Convention. Senator Specter noted that the Torture Convention
already contemplated enactment of an extraterritorial criminal statute by state
parties, and he asked why enactment of an extraterritorial civil statute would be
inconsistent with the Convention. The Justice Department spokesman replied
that with a criminal statute the executive branch would have control over
whether to prosecute, whereas a civil statute would put sensitive foreign policy
matters in the hands of private individuals. 325 Senator Specter acknowledged
this explanation, but he went on to shepherd the bill through the Senate. 326 The
Act passed Congress with overwhelming bipartisan support, which was
apparently enough to persuade the Administration to drop its opposition. On
March 16, 1992, President Bush grudgingly signed the bill into law. His
signing statement, which reiterates the Administration's arguments against the
3 27
bill, reads more like an explanation of a veto.
This curious legislative history reflects the peculiar balance of federal
power over foreign relations. When political actors in the United States wish to
shape international law, the competing branches of government understandably
322

See id. at 9 (testimony of John 0. McGinnis, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't
of Justice) (arguing for the "multilateral" approach embodied in the treaty).
323 Id. at 31 (remarks of Sen. Simon).
3 24

Id. at 35 (testimony of Mr. Stewart).
325 Id. at 34 (remarks of Sen. Specter and testimony of Mr. McGinnis).

326 See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. S2667-69 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Specter) (arguing for enactment of the TVPA and expressing his acknowledgement of the

explanation with a polite "OK. Thank you very much.").
3 27
The statement warns of "danger that U.S. courts may become embroiled in
difficult and sensitive disputes in other countries, and possibly ill-founded or politically
motivated suits, which have nothing to do with the United States and which offer little
prospect of successful recovery." Such abuse would cause "serious frictions" in U.S.
foreign relations and would also waste U.S. judicial resources. "[T]here is too much

litigation at present even by Americans against Americans," much less by aliens against
aliens. Nonetheless, "[W]e must maintain and strengthen our commitment to ensuring that
human rights are respected everywhere." Statement by President George Bush Upon

Signing H.R. 2092, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 465 (Mar. 16, 1992).
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use the tools over which they have the most authority. The President treats;
Congress legislates. Thus, in the debate over the TVPA, the President saw
implementation of our treaty obligations as the first priority, whereas Congress
was more interested in fashioning a new remedy not found in the Torture
Convention. Paradoxically, the implied limitation on extraterritorial civil suits
in the multilateral Convention-the most "democratic" form of international
law-meant more to the Administration than to the more "democratic" (with a
small "d") Congress, which sought to create a remedy rejected by the framers
of the Convention. The paradox is compounded by the political identity of the
actors involved: the same Republican President who invaded Panama to execute
a search warrant 328 opposed the TVPA because of inconsistencies with
international law, just as the same Congress that trumpets the virtues of
international law32 9 was more interested in expanding on the Torture
330
Convention than ratifying or implementing it.
Perhaps much of this paradox can be explained by the underlying
substantive issue: A Republican President is likely to oppose measures that
impose greater burdens on the courts, just as a Democratic (with a large "d")
Congress is likely to tolerate such burdens in exchange for broader vindication
of individual rights. Under this view, one invokes international law when it
serves one's real agenda. In other words, to misquote Senator Moynihan, "real
men do cite Grotius"-when it is in their interests to do so. 331 But this view
does not explain why the TVPA enjoyed so much Republican support in
Congress. In fact, few members of Congress, Democrat or Republican, were
convinced that the TVPA would add much to the workload of the courts, since
so few defendants would be available for suit. The TVPA does not repeal the
Due Process Clause.
Perhaps Republicans in Congress more readily supported the TVPA than
the Republican President because they sought to make their own mark on
foreign policy and international law, independent of treaties and other foreign
32 8

See Warren Richey, Noriega's Ouster CarriesHefty Price Tag, C.

TRiB., Sept.

8, 1991, § 1, at 27 (quoting Professor Baldwin's description of the capture of Noriega as
"the most expensive execution of a search warrant ever").

329 See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S5767-68 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Specter) (condemning Iraqi violations of international law); 137 CoNG. REC. S987-88 (daily
ed. Jan. 17, 1991) (statement of Sen. Moynihan) (urging President Bush to adhere to
international law).
330 Two years after the enactment of the TVPA, the Torture Convention was finally
implemented by Congress. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 103-236,
§ 506, 108 Stat. 382 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340, 2340A).
331 See DANmL P. MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 7 (1990) ("[]n the 1980s

[international law] had come to be associated with weakness in foreign policy. Real men did
not cite Grotius.").
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policy initiatives of the President. Unless it makes legislation, Congress plays
an essentially passive role in the making of foreign policy. The President, by
contrast, conducts diplomacy, deploys United States military personnel,
appoints and receives ambassadors, and makes and abrogates treaties and
alliances. Even the Senate's power to approve treaties is a passive power that is
exercised only over a tiny minority of international agreements. And even that
power is limited: though the Senate has grown more adept at attaching
reservations and the like to treaties, in the end it still must simply vote yea or
nay. As Professor Koh says, the President almost always "wins" in foreign
affairs. 332 On occasion, however, Congress can win by passing legislation.
Legislation can implement or override treaty obligations, and even (as in the
case of the TVPA) contribute to the development of new international law.
Innovative legislation like the TVPA allows members of Congress to tell their
constituents that they initiated a change in foreign policy, not just that they
followed the President's lead.
Thus, Congress may well have an institutional incentive to act
independently of the treaty process, and perhaps even to marginalize the treaty
process. This incentive has grown stronger in the past thirty years as foreign
policy debacles like Vietnam and scandals like Watergate have diminished
public confidence in the executive branch. Indeed, during that period Congress
has taken an unprecedented interest in foreign policy. Congress has created and
often initiated much of the law that has Americanized international law, in
particular, the extensive network of extraterritorial statutes on narcotics and
terrorism. More generally, Congress has established legislative guidelines on
virtually all aspects of foreign policy, from the war powers and national
security to immigration, terrorism, narcotics, human rights, and nuclear
nonproliferation. What was once a handful of laws is now collected in a
333
multivolume set entitled Legislation on ForeignRelations.
By the same token, Congress has an institutional interest in preserving the
doctrine of self-executing treaties, which ensures that both Houses of Congress
will have an opportunity to implement a treaty before it becomes law. Many
Presidents would undoubtedly love to have the power to change United States
domestic law solely by treaty, and many members of Congress would no doubt
balk at such a regime.
None of this is to suggest that Congress has gone too far. On the contrary,

Congress has made the executive branch a more alert and thorough custodian
of foreign policy. The congressional requirement of annual reports on matters
332

See generally Harold H. Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign
Affairs: Lessons ofthe Iran-ContraAffair, 97 YALE LJ.1255 (1988).
333 U.S. CONGRESS, COMM. ON FOREIGN AFF. & COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

(1992).
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like human rights and narcotics, for example, forces the Department of State to
factor those matters into its foreign policymaking. At the State Department,
grumbling about the human rights reports has diminished with time.3 34 In my
view, the annual human rights report has evolved into a useful tool of the
Executive's foreign policy. Moreover, when Congress has "pushed the
envelope" and legislated "unilaterally" for the United States-that is,
independently of treaty obligations-it has often created useful innovations that
may some day inspire enough imitations abroad to crystallize into customary
international law. The TVPA is an illustration; the antiterrorism and
antinarcotics laws are others.
My only purpose here is to suggest that legislative innovation is in tension
with stable treaty relations, since unilateral legislation will often produce
different results than multilateral negotiation. A Congress that wishes to make
its mark must do something different than the President, and that means doing
something other than what is contained in existing or contemplated treaty
obligations. This action, in turn, means that the United States will continue to
establish new unilateral customs that may or may not crystallize into general
and consistent practice around the world. Thus, the "congressification" of
American foreign policy may hasten the death of Treaty, and, at the same time,
Americanize international law.
There is much to be said for the congressification of international law. It
encourages innovation in the international system, and, like the Security
Council, it moves more quickly than the cumbersome treaty process. Already
the TVPA has prompted a class action lawsuit charging the Bosnian Serb leader
Radovan Karadzic with responsibility for mass rape and other atrocities
committed in the Balkan conflict. 335 Meanwhile, the Security Council's new

336
war crimes tribunal, though established in record time, is still not operating.
Nonetheless, unilateral congressional action-like unilateral action by states or
even hasty action by the Security Council-often suffers because it lacks input
from other states, whose cooperation may be essential to the success of a
particular legislative initiative. Would not the TVPA be more effective if it
were coupled with a multilateral agreement to enforce judgments against
334

See Kim C. Williamson, Counting the Pain: The U.S. Country Reports on Human

Rights Practices 8, 16 (Spring 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (noting
that foreign service officers initially took a dim view of the reporting requirement, but that
much skepticism has now dissipated).
335 jane Doe v. Karadzic, No. 93-Civ.-878 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 11, 1993). See Paul

Lewis, Immunity Sought for Bosnian Serb, N.Y. TiMas, Feb. 23, 1993, at A8 (reporting on
Karadzic's efforts to obtain immunity from the suit while visiting the United States for peace

talks).
336 See Foot-Draggingon War Crimes, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 5, 1993, at A20.
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torturers? 337 Perhaps the TVPA will inspire such an agreement. If so, it will be
an unmitigated success; if not, it will surely be better than nothing.
There certainly is room for legislation that stretches the boundaries of
international law. Congress should bear in mind, however, that it has a more
fundamental responsibility to ensure that existing international law is given
effect. The Senate should give higher priority to its duty to advise and consent
to the ratification of treaties. Once ratified, treaties often require implementing
legislation because the self-executing treaty doctrine ensures that many ratified
treaties are a dead letter as a matter of domestic law. For example, while
Congress has stretched the limits of the Torture Convention by enacting the
TVPA, Congress has still not gotten around to the more basic task of enacting
legislation to carry out the central provisions of the Torture Convention relating
to the criminalization of torture and the extradition of torturers. The Torture
Convention is only one case in point. The 102d Congress had a better-thanaverage record in approving treaties, but many important treaties on subjects
338
ranging from human rights to environmental law still await ratification.
In sum, Congress may be able to diminish the importance of treaties by
legislating unilaterally. In some areas, like crime, such development would be
unfortunate, in others, like human rights, it may be tolerable or even salutary.
The greater danger, however, is that Congress will do nothing to approve or
implement agreements-that it will allow treaties to wither and die of neglect.

337 Indeed, the Security Council considered and rejected a proposal to empower the
new war crimes tribunal with broad authority to order compensation for victims of war
crimes. See RAPPORTEURS UNDER THE CSCE Moscow HuMAN DIMENSION MECHANISM TO
BosNI-IEoviNA AND CROATIA, PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YuGOsLAviA 113 (1993) (draft Article 33 of court statute)

(proposing a right to restitution as well as "appropriate compensation"). The final version of
the tribunal's statute appears to authorize restitution only, without any other compensation.
See Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 237, at 29 (Article 24(3) of statute).
The accompanying Security Council resolution appears to confirm that the tribunal will
not concern itself directly with compensation other than restitution; it holds that the tribunal
should work "without prejudice to the right of the victims" to seek compensation "through
appropriate means." S.C. Res. 827, supra note 91, at 2.
338 See S. REp. No. 35, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1993) (reporting that during the
102d Congress, the full Senate approved only 49 of 89 pending treaties and that important
human rights instruments still await action).
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IV. CONCLUSION AND SPECULATIONS

Speaking descriptively, we might say that Treaty is being absorbed into
Legislation. 339 On the domestic plane, treaty law is not received into United
States law unless Congress blesses it and executes it with implementing
legislation. As we have seen, Congress seems increasingly overwhelmed by
this responsibility. Even if a treaty is ratified and implemented, it still has only
the status of a piece of legislation, and it can be repealed or modified by a
subsequent Congress at any time. 340 On the international plane, treaty law is of
decreasing importance to our system of collective security, which has replaced
the nineteenth century's network of bilateral treaties with the legislative
pronouncements of the Security Council. The Council now carries out tasks
traditionally assigned to treaties, such as the defense of states like Kuwait and
the establishment of a war crimes tribunal for Yugoslavia, and occasionally it
even alters existing treaty relations to achieve its goals. Outside of security
matters, treatymaking is still alive and well. In this century, however, it has
become a much more multilateral enterprise, and multilateral conferences
resemble nothing more than legislative sessions.
The doctrinal plane suggests a slightly different trend. From a doctrinal
standpoint, Treaty is slowly being reabsorbed into an international law version
of Tort. Unilateral promises and promissory estoppel now compete with
agreement, as alternative sources of liability. As with the doctrine of
consideration, however, the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda remains the rule;
upstarts like "international promissory estoppel" remain the exception. For
now, the doctrinal decline of Treaty is less pronounced than its institutional
decline.
In many respects, the decline of Treaty and the rise of Legislation is a
"Good Thing." 341 It reflects a growing democratization of international law, a
sense that ordinary people and small states have as much interest in its
development as powerful politicians and superpowers. On the domestic plane,
the congressification of foreign policy has led to increased attention to those
aspects of international law affecting individuals-human rights, torture,
narcotics, terrorism, and immigration, to name a few. There was a time when
339 Cf. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 87 ("Speaking descriptively, we might say that what

is happening is that 'contract' is being reabsorbed into the mainstream of 'tort.'").
340 See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1888); United States v.
Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

341 See WALTER C. SELLAR, 1066 AND ALL THAT (1975) (dividing all of English
history into "Good Things" and "Bad Things"). For more analysis along these lines, see
E.O. PAiRoTT & W.F.N. WATSON, THE DOGSBODY PAPERS, OR, 1066 AND ALL THIs

(1988).
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some of these subjects-in particular human rights-were not thought to be fit
subjects for international law, and thus not relevant to foreign policy. 342 On the
international plane, increased reliance on the Security Council may favor the
powerful Permanent Five members of the Council, but it also gives a
significant say to the smaller states that outnumber the Perm-5 on the Council
343
and therefore wield a "nonaligned" veto.
While the legislative model of international law has its strengths, it also has
its weaknesses. Legislatures are slow and inefficient. In domestic politics, a
legislative model means a more democratic model, since more actors are
involved in the decisionmaking process. Inevitably, though, a more democratic
foreign policy also means a more cumbersome foreign policy. Oftentimes
congressional delay will frustrate the development of international law in
United States law, while at other times congressional adventurism will
complicate the task of the Executive. On occasion, the United States will speak
with different voices, thereby diluting or even obscuring American intentions
and American influence abroad. In international politics, a more legislative
system in some ways means a less democratic system of international relations,
since the direct democracy of treaty negotiations is replaced by the
representative democracy of the United Nations Security Council. This
"republic" operates more quickly than the traditional "democracy" of the
multilateral conference, but it also excludes participation by the vast majority of
states, thereby enhancing the risk of noncompliance.
On balance, the advantages of the legislative model nonetheless outweigh
the disadvantages. A less efficient American foreign policy is also a more
stable one. The cumbersome multilateral conference and the more efficient but
less representative Security Council help ensure that as many states as possible
contribute to international law, thus preserving its legitimacy.
In any event, it appears that the legislative model is here to stay.
Domestically, Congress is not about to give up its relatively new influence over
foreign relations law. There may be partisan differences about the extent to
which Congress should "micromanage" foreign policy, but there is bipartisan
consensus that Congress should do more than just react to executive branch
initiatives. Internationally, it seems unlikely that global security will again be
governed exclusively by a web of bilateral alliances or that law-making
multilateral conferences will wither away. The future of the Security Council is
less certain, for it depends on internal developments in Russia and China. For
3 42

For descriptions of this view, see Mark W. Janis, Individuals as Subjects of
InternationalLaw, 17 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 61 (1984); Louis Sohn, The New International
Law: Protection ofthe Rights of IndividualsRather than States, 32 AM. U. L. Rv. 1 (1982)
(tracing evolution of human rights law).
343 See Reisman, supra note 233, at 84.
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now, all indications are that the United Nations intends to strengthen itself.344
Even in the absence of a strong Security Council, however, states would
continue to organize themselves into regional alliances and economic zones like
NATO and the European Community, for such confederations provide both
military and economic advantages.
Twenty years ago, Professor Gilmore observed that law, like literature and
art, oscillates between classical and romantic phases. In relatively dull classical
times, all is "neat, tidy and logical," and formal rules of structure dominate the
field. 3 45 Eventually the classical sensibility "breaks down in a protracted
romantic agony," during which romantics innovate, improvise, and "deny the
existence of any rules," resulting in a more interesting mix of confusion, chaos,
and unlimited self-expression. 346 This phase, too, subsides, and classical forms
again reassert themselves by imposing order on the wilderness. According to
Professor Gilmore, the nineteenth century was the classical era of contract law,
the height of doctrinal formalism, and the twentieth century has been the
romantic backlash, the era of promissory estoppel and public policy doctrine.
Much the same can be said about international law. The classical era of
international law reached its height in nineteenth century Europe, when an
interlocking jigsaw puzzle of bilateral treaties defined international relations.
Foreign policy was driven by the distribution of military and economic power,
not by idealistic notions of the sovereign equality of states, world government,
or human rights. This period stressed the sanctity of treaty obligations and
rejected formless exceptions like the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus (changed
circumstances).3 47 The United States adhered to the notion that the chief
executive was the "sole organ" in foreign policy, and that the only role of
Congress was to ensure that the President's treaties were properly ratified and
executed. 348 International politics was a game played by the few, not the
344 See, e.g., BouTRos BouTRos-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE (1992) (calling on
states to supply troops for a standing U.N. force); cf.Steven A. Holmes, Clinton May Let
U.S. Troops Serve Under U.N. Ondeft, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 18, 1993, at A1.
345 GILMORE, supranote 1, at 102.
3 46
Id.
3 47

See The London Declaration, Jan. 17, 1871, reprinted in Bederman, supra note
65, at 3 (declaring that states must abide by treaties without exception).
348 See, e.g., In re Thomas Kaine, 55 U.S. 103, 138 (1852); United States v. Smith,

27 F. Cas. 1233, 1235 (C.C.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342A); United States v. Robins, 27 F.
Cas. 825, 867 (C.C.D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175). John Marshall helped popularize the
phrase in a speech before the House of Representatives. "The President is the sole organ of
the nation in its external relations... ." 2 ANNALs OF CONG. 466 (1800).
The phrase has continued to turn up in twentieth century decisions. See United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936), quoted in United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203, 229 (1942). Curtiss-Wight has been criticized but never overruled, and it

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:781

many-by powerful states and a few of their most powerful leaders, not by
small states and their legislatures. Diplomacy was a highly personal business
carried out between individuals instead of bureaucracies, and it produced a
concrete result in the form of a treaty. Nineteenth century treaties often had the
character of personal contracts between individual leaders.
The twentieth century has been a romantic era of international law. It
began with Woodrow Wilson and others who dreamed of a new multipolar
world in which war was illegal and disputes were settled in a peaceful forum
like the League of Nations. International relations was no longer just a process,
a perpetual balancing of power relations; it had a substantive goal, the
promotion of democracy and even human rights. The disaster of World War II
killed the League of Nations, but it did not destroy Wilsonian idealism. Instead
of giving up in despair, the idealists tried again by inventing a United Nations
explicitly dedicated to goals that nineteenth century realists would have mocked
as unrealistic and even offensive to state sovereignty. The United Nations
Charter sought no less than to "save succeeding generations from the scourge
of war" and to affirm "the dignity and worth of the human person" and to
promote "social progress and better standards of life." 349 Our most prominent
350
jurists wrote unapologetically of the need for effective world government.
The idealism continues today. Multilateral conferences hammer out
international legislation on such diverse subjects as the environment, human
rights, trade, whaling, fisheries, copyright law, cultural property, and judicial
assistance. International agreements now bear the fingerprints of thousands of
bureaucrats from countries big and small, not just the signature of two
prominent politicians. Among scholars of international law, meanwhile, there is
hopeful talk of "human rights" for whales351 and a power of judicial review for
the World Court. 352 We like to speak as if international law matters.
continues to support the proposition that sovereignty is a source of the federal foreign affairs
power quite apart from any specific grant of power in the Constitution. See HENIN, supra
note 259, at 23-26. But its insistence that the President is the "sole" foreign policy "organ"
is difficult to square with modem foreign relations law in which the Congress and even the
judiciary play at least some role. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); HAROLD H. KoH, THE NATiONAL SEcurrY
CoNsTrrurIoN 105-13 (1989).
349 U.N. CHARTERpmbl.,

1.

350 See, e.g., PHmip JEssuP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 2 (1948) ("Until the world
achieves some form of international government in which a collective will takes precedence
over the individual will of the sovereign state, the ultimate function of law, which is the
elimination of force for the solution of human conflicts, will not be fulfilled.").
351 See Anthony D'Amato and Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales. Their Emerging Right to
Life, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 21, 27 (1991) ("We believe that the phrase 'human rights' is only
superficially species chauvinistic. In a profound sense, whales and some other sentient
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Perhaps a new era of classicism awaits in the wings. Realists have long
warned against excessive romanticism about the prospects for world
government. 353 And sure enough, the romantic euphoria of the immediate postCold War era has already dissipated. Visions of a U.S.-Russian partnership are
now clouded by the rise of Russian nationalism. Dreams of a harmonious and
effective Security Council have been replaced by television pictures of the
demise of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hopes for political and monetary union in
Europe have given way to the reality of differing sovereign interests. 354 The
"new world order" increasingly resembles the old world order of the
nineteenth century-a jumbled, fractured, decentralized community of many
355
competing states.
If states continue to break up into many smaller states, and if Russia or
China stop cooperating with the West in the Security Council, then multilateral
forms of international relations and law-making will naturally become more
unwieldy, and diplomacy may revert to more traditional forms. International
law may move away from legislative models of law-making like Security
Council resolutions and toward contract models like bilateral treaties. Treaty,
like Contract, is dead-"but who knows what unlikely resurrection the Easter356
tide may bring?"

mammals are entitled to human rights, or at least to humanist rights

...
") (footnote
omitted). I do not mean to mock this view, for in essence I share it; I merely suggest that it
reflects the idealism of our day.

For more on the propriety of the term "human" rights, see PETER SINGER, ANIMAL

LIBERATioN: A NEW ETmics FOR OUR TREATMENT OF ANIMALS 223-58 (1975). Cy. STAR
TREK VI: THE UNDISCOVERED COUNTRY (Paramount Pictures 1992) (providing a Klingon
view of the term "human rights").
352
See Watson, supra note 200, at 28-45.
353
See W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Grss in the United Nations, 87 AM.

J. INT'L L. 83, 94 (1993) (deriding "incurable judicial romantics who look to courts as a
type of deus e moachina").
354

See A Survey of the European Community: A Rude Awakening-The Shame of It,

THE ECONOmIST, July 3, 1993, at 16-17 (describing dim prospects for a European union).
355

But cf. Paul Krugman, Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession, FOREIGN AFF.,

Mar./Apr. 1994, at 28, 32-41 (criticizing the notion that states "compete" in any
meaningful sense).
356 GILMORE, supra note 1, at 103.

